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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF ITS
POLITICIZATION
Joy Gordon
INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes said that the concept of human rights is
"the only political-moral idea that has received universal ac-
ceptance."' Some describe human rights as the central moral
issue in international relations today-as the "currency of
international moral discourse, " or as the "modern tool of revo-
lution" in "the struggle for ... human dignity in our time."3
The concept of human rights is also invoked with increasing
frequency in the context of security issues and as justification
of armed conflict.4
In one sense, the concept of human rights is as familiar to
us as the nightly news. It would be hard to read a national
newspaper on any given day without finding a reference to
death squads, disappearances, torture, mutilation, mass rape,
siege and starvation of civilian populations, or arrests of dissi-
dents somewhere in the world.5 Yet in another sense, it eludes
discussion altogether: our ethical intuition is that human
rights violations involve acts which are so patently monstrous
that there could be no rational or moral justification for them;
and that only someone who is depraved or irrational could
seriously take issue with either the goodness or the urgency of
human rights. At the same time, there is a further debate as to
how broad the notion of human rights should be.'
1. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ix (1990).
2. Martin Shupack, The Churches and Human Rights: Catholic and Protes-
tant Human Rights Views as Reflected in Church Statements, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 127, 127 (1993).
3. Irwin Cotler, Human Rights as the Modern Tool of Revolution, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7, 7 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul
Mahoney eds., 1993).
4. See generally Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global
Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827
(1993). This is especially true for the United States.
5. A recent search of the NEXIS database revealed that during the last two
years there were approximately 87,000 news articles in the United States which
mentioned the term "human rights."
6. For many years now it has been suggested that the label of "human
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Among contemporary commentators, the standard notion
of human rights is sometimes framed in terms of "generations"
of rights. "First-generation" rights are, as one scholar points
out, "the traditional liberties and privileges of citizenship,
covered by the first twenty articles of the [Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights]: free speech, religious liberty, the right
not to be tortured, the right to a fair trial, the right to vote,
and so forth."'
This notion is quite familiar to us. Less familiar are socio-
economic "second-generation rights"--the right to work, the
right to fair pay, the right to food, shelter and clothing, the
right to education, etc.' In this Article, I will argue that the
concept of human rights which is so familiar is in fact quite
odd and inconsistent; and that underlying this oddness is a
profoundly political structure and a history of political uses.
The claim that the concept of human rights has an under-
rights" is applied too broadly, with the result that the term is amorphous or
overbroad. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal
for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT L. 607, 607 (1984) (observing that there has
been an expansion of "new rights" achieved in a "haphazard, almost anarchic man-
ner."); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUm. L. REv. 1110, 1110 (1982) (noting that human rights "has been the subject
of a burgeoning jurisprudential literature."); see also generally Theodor Meron, On
a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INVL L. 1 (1986) (arguing
for an enlarged core of non-derogable rights, rather than tiers of rights).
7. JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 5 (1993).
8. See id. at 4-5. Third-generation rights, which I will not address here,
concern collective and communal rights involving national self-determination, cul-
tural practices, use of native languages and so on. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza
Hernlndez-Truyol, Report of the Conference Rapporteur, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1389,
1407 (1995) (Final Report to the Conference on the International Protection of Re-
productive Rights, referring to "first (civil and political rights), second (social and
economic rights) and third (solidarity) generation human rights."); Kathleen
Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human Rights and Strategies for
their Implementation, 21 BROOK J. INTL L. 799, 837-38 (1996) (noting that third
generation "group or peoples' rights are of greatest interest to developing coun-
tries."); Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the
1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 435, 441 (1981) (observing that Karel Vasak has dis-
tinguished the third generation of human rights as being "predicated on brother-
hood (fraternitd), in the sense of solidarity" as opposed to rights predicated on
libertd (first generation rights) or dgalitd (second generation rights)); Feisal Hussain
Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization of
Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND. L.J. 673, 713 (1996) (understand-
ing third generation rights, such as the right to "cultural integrity" and "the right
to development" as "expand[ing] the economic entitlements of individuals."); Barba-
ra Stark, Conceptions of International Peace and Environmental Rights: "The Re-
mains of the Day", 59 TENN. L. REV. 651, 654 (1992).
692
1998] THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 693
lying political agenda is not new. Feminist critics have made
the claim in analyzing the consequences of the dominant con-
cept for women In addition, both Western critics and non-
Western nations have suggested that this concept, with its
emphasis on political rather than economic rights, reflects a
bias in favor of wealthy Western nations.' ° Many have suggest-
9. See, e.g., Sarah Y. Lai & Regan E. Ralph, Recent Development, Female
Sexual Autonomy and Human Rights, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201, 203 (1995) (dis-
cussing the economic/political dichotomy as it impacts on protections of the rights
of women); Shelley Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist
Perspective, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 861, 874 (1995) (observing the effect
that the "division between political and civil rights versus economic, social and
cultural rights" has had "on how economic rights and social justice are dis-
cussed."). Also relevant to this discussion are feminist arguments contending that
effective political participation by women is undermined by the fact that the stan-
dard concept of human rights rests upon the public/private distinction. See Celina
Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 87 (1993); see also
Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence
Against Women, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 195, 195 (1993); Mahoney, supra note 8, at
800; Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa:
Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. iN
L. 857, 860 (1996); Barbara Stark, International Human Rights Law, Feminist
Jurisprudence, and Nietzsche's "Eternal Return":" Turning the Wheel, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 169, 169-70 (1996).
10. See Sompong Sucharitkul, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights
in International Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 305, 305 (1987) (observing that "the
international instruments proclaiming the Rights of Man or the International Cove-
nants of Human Rights merely incorporate the view and concepts advocated by the
authors and draftsmen of those instruments, who have invariably been trained in
Western or European legal traditions."). See also Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Cri-
tique of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, 31 HOW. L.J. 643, 658
(1988) (discussing the primacy that economic development has for political leaders
in Africa); Goler Teal Butcher, The Immediacy of International Law for Howard
University Students, 31 HOW. L.J. 435, 445 (1988) (contending that the United
States "stands out as the state which, while promoting the rights of individuals
against the excesses of government, that is civil and political rights, is opposed to
a concept of a human right not to be hungry, a right to have work, the right to
education."). But see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523-24 (1992) (noting that welfare rights "have become a
staple feature of post-war international declarations and have been accorded a
place beside traditional political and civil liberties in the national constitutions of
most liberal democracies."). This issue is sometimes addressed in the context of
the debate over cultural relativism in human rights. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 35 (1993); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a
Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights, in
HUmi RIGHTS AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 19, (Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na'im ed., 1992); Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 740, 740 (1994); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal
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ed that human rights issues must be addressed in the context
of the larger relations between First World and Third World,
and in the context of development and modernization."
During the Cold War, there was extensive debate about
the political and economic interests underlying the notion of
human rights. Western governments and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) (such as Amnesty International) routine-
ly condemned the Eastern bloc countries for human rights
violations, partly on the grounds that the judicial and electoral
processes were inadequate or oppressive. The Soviets would
respond that in their view, human rights entailed health care,
education, employment and economic equity. They accused
their Western critics of purporting to offer a "universal" stan-
dard which in fact reflected Western First World societies,
Human Rights, 6 HUMI. RTS. Q. 400, 400-19 (1984) (examining the "competing
claims of cultural relativism and universal human rights" and advocating an ap-
proach to reconciling them that "preserves the tension between and the insights of,
both relativism and universalism."); Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Relativism and the
Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315, 315 (1993) (analyzing the concept
of cultural relativism, as that concept is employed by traditionalists and by
communitarians, and concluding that it is in fact a form of cultural absolutism);
Christopher C. Joyner & John C. Dettling, Bridging the Cultural Chasm: Cultural
Relativism and the Future of International Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 275, 275
(1990); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the
Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUMI. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 49, 56-59 (1993); Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights
and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INTL L. 869 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Arthur A. Baer, Latino Human Rights and the Global Economic
Order, 18 CHIcANo-LATINo L. REV. 80, 80-81 (1996); Susan M. Davis, WEDO and
the Public Advocacy Agenda in Creating Sustainable Human Development, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 179, 187 n.14 (1995) (discussing the position of the Women's Envi-
ronment and Development Organization); Robert F. Drinan, S.J. Sovereignty and
Human Rights, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 75, 84-85 (1994); J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-2 (1995) (observing that economic, social and cultural
rights have been neglected and emphasizing the need to devote more attention to
those rights); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (reviewing LAw AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed.,
1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul
Pajiwala eds., 1993)). Davis, among others, contends that the extreme economic
disparities between First World and Third World need to be recognized more ex-
plicitly as the context in which any discussion of human rights can take place. As
Davis points out, Third World countries account for "three-fourths of the global
population," while receiving "only 30% of the world's income." Davis, supra, at 187.
She notes that "the North consumes 70% of the world[']s energy, 75% of its metal,
85% of its wood and 60% of its food." Id. at 188. Drinan notes that 40,000 chil-
dren die each day from preventable diseases and that the United States, with 4%
of the global population, consumes 40% of its food. See Drinan, supra, at 84-85.
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which had highly developed political systems, but also great
economic disparities. The Western governments and NGOs
would reply that it was not they who were self-serving, but the
Soviets, whose theory of human rights reflected the Commu-
nist view that political rights were insignificant compared to
economic benefits. 2 Thus, each accused the other of claiming to
set forth a universal and impartial standard of basic rights,
which was in fact not impartial at all, but patently self-serv-
ing, and whose validity was therefore compromised.
I am not interested in resurrecting this particular ex-
change of accusations. However, what interests me about it is
that in some sense both sides are right: it is impossible not to
see how closely the two concepts correspond to the political and
rhetorical agendas of the Cold War. If this is so, then we must
12. See Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights,
19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 92 n.18 (1996) (commenting on Soviet and Western
objections to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and observing that "[tihe
Soviets were opposed to the preponderance of Western civil liberties . . . . Western
nations were persuaded to include economic, social and cultural rights in the docu-
ment only after having been persuaded that it would not be legally binding" (cita-
tion omitted)). Another commentator, Aart Hendriks, notes that:
For a long time, social rights were associated with communism, seen as
the justification given by socialist governments to suppress the civil and
political rights of their opponents. The degree of government interference
that these rights seemed to necessitate were, in addition, often perceived
to be "inherently incompatible" with the rules of a free market economy.
Aart Hendriks, Promotion and Protection of Women's Right to Sexual and Repro-
ductive Health Under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the Women's
Convention, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1995). Henry Steiner, in reviewing Louis
Henkin's THE AGE OF RIGHTS, noted that:
Throughout the Cold War, it was notorious that many communist coun-
tries, particularly the Soviet Union, justified their political systems in
terms of the priority given to and the asserted realizations of economic
and social rights, while simultaneously mocking the significance of bour-
geois civil and political rights in Western democracies.
Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 HARV. L. REV. 917, 928 n.17 (1991)
(review of HENKIN, supra note 1). Steiner additionally observed that, since the
commencement of the Reagan Administration, the United States "has taken the
position" that either "welfare claims cannot constitute rights or that the securing
of civil and political rights is an essential condition to economic and social devel-
opment and must be the focus of urgent attention." Id. (citations omitted). See also
Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations
Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 160 (1987); Barabara Stark, Economic Rights in the United
States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy",
44 HAsTINGS L.J. 79, 84 (1992) (discussing our need to rethink "our Cold War
aversion to 'economic rights.").
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ask ourselves: Is there a notion of human rights which has no
agenda, which serves no political interests and which is truly
universal? If there is not-if any concept of human rights is
grounded in some political or economic interest-then is there
nevertheless some principled, rational justification for adopting
one concept of human rights rather than another?13
Part I of this Article traces the emergence of the standard
notion of human rights in the second half of the twentieth
century, in the context of international law and diplomacy. In
the Nuremberg tribunal of 1946, we see a notion of human
rights as atrocities, "crimes against humanity." In the United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights 14 (Universal
Declaration), the notion is broadened enormously such that it
includes almost every dimension of life-social, economic, polit-
ical, cultural and familial. In the 1960s, these rights were
bifurcated into two treaties, one concerning atrocities and
political and civil rights; and one concerning social and eco-
nomic rights. The former contained requirements for immedi-
ate compliance by all states, as well as mechanisms for en-
forcement. The latter contained neither of these. The major
NGOs (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch)
largely reiterate this distinction and define human rights viola-
tions in terms of atrocities and political rights; but not econom-
ic rights.
Part II considers the asymmetry of this bifurcated struc-
ture of the contemporary Western notion of human rights. The
standard notion of human rights now consists roughly of two
categories of acts: atrocities, such as torture, mass murder and
summary executions; and deprivation of political rights, such
13. These questions, it seems to me, have to be resolved first in order to
address issues related to the proliferation and conflicts among the purported rights
advanced in the political, academic and legal literature-the right to life, the right
to die, the right to employment, the right to subsistence in the absence of employ-
ment, the right to publish pornography, the right to live in a pornography-free
society, individual rights, group rights, the right to use natural resources, the
right of the environment to be protected from overuse, the right of non-discrimina-
tion, the right of free (and sometimes discriminatory) expression and so on. For
general discussions of these matters see HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY, supra note 3; PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Patricia H.
Werhane et al. eds., 1986).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
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as rights of speech, press, multi-party elections and judicial
process. It does not include economic rights, such as the right
to employment, housing, food and medical care. Why is this so?
I propose that we begin by adopting a reasonably
uncontroversial definition of human rights (although I will
consider other variations at a later point) and assume that
"human rights" are those resources or conditions which consti-
tute the minimal conditions for human existence. If by "human
rights," we mean "those elements which constitute the minimal
conditions for human existence," then freedom from torture or
death would certainly be included; but food and shelter would
be as well. At the same time, it is not clear that speech and
press in fact occupy the same fundamental role in human sur-
vival (although they may be indirectly necessary as a means to
ensuring the satisfaction of human needs which are direct and
immediate). Thus, the standard notion on one hand classes
together rights which are very different in nature (atrocities
and political rights); while excluding other rights (economic
rights) which seem as directly essential to human well-being (if
not more so) than political rights.
Parts III and IV trace the particular content of the modern
idea of human rights to two distinct sources: the doctrine of
Just War starting with Augustine and the Enlightenment
conception of rights. Just War theory concerns the duties owed
in wartime to enemies-to those toward whom one has no legal
or domestic ties at all. The Just War doctrine prohibits torture
as well as the unnecessary killing of civilians, wounded sol-
diers and prisoners of war. Thus, it concerns the minimal level
of decency owed to someone simply because he or she is a hu-
man being. The Enlightenment notion of rights, however, is
very different. It envisions the assertion of the rights of liberty,
equality, fraternity and happiness-in short, the conception of
a good and full life-not the minimal conditions for survival
and the minimal obligation of decency. The Enlightenment
rights differ from Just War "rights" in nature as well as con-
tent. In the Enlightenment tradition, rights are abstract rather
than concrete; political rather than personal; broadly rather
than narrowly conceived; and counterfactual in form. Part V
takes a brief look at the arguments of Dworkin and Gewirth
regarding the "existence" of rights. It suggests that, although
their arguments are quite sophisticated, the Enlightenment
view of rights-which is not only problematic but paradoxi-
1998] 697
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cal-is reiterated in their work as well.
Part VI revisits Bentham's and Marx's critiques of the
Enlightenment notion of rights and their arguments that "a
right to X" is not itself a thing that one can possess. The ques-
tion is, "what is it that you have, exactly, when you have a
'right' to food, for example, but have no actual food?" If we hold
to an idealist metaphysics, we would still consider that we
have something of significance. If we hold to a materialist
metaphysics, then the answer is "obviously nothing at all."
Finally, Part VII returns to the Nuremberg tribunals as a
way of looking very concretely at the question of what has hap-
pened when "human rights" are invoked and looking also at
the status of human rights as a "moral trump." Nuremberg is,
after all, the first occasion on which the notion of human rights
was treated as an actual law, on the basis of which trial and
conviction took place. We are accustomed to thinking of the
charges brought at Nuremberg as transcending political inter-
ests. We would generally think that if there are any "crimes
against humanity" which would be universally recognized, they
would be the acts of the Nazis in World War II. I review some
of the many ways in which the trial served as a political pro-
ject of the victors which explicitly rejected the rule of law at
every turn, for the larger purpose of presenting a moral dem-
onstration of the Nazis' absolute evil. We see this, for example,
in the explicit exclusion of Allied war crimes; the fact that
precisely the same parties served as legislators, prosecutors
and judges; the tribunal's dubious claim to jurisdiction; and the
tribunal's prohibition against raising the issue of jurisdiction
in any forum. Because the denunciation of the Nazis in a sense
consumed all the moral space, the victors could lay claim not
only to relative goodness, but-implicitly and explicit-
ly-absolute and universal goodness. The Nuremberg accusa-
tions, in the end, functioned not as an occasion for moral dis-
course, but as a moral diatribe which effectively excluded the
possibility of moral discourse.
I suggest that we inherit these features in our current
notion of human rights-both the implicit claim of absolute
goodness and the suppression of moral discourse. This occurs
insofar as a claim of human rights violations operates as a
kind of "moral trump," alongside of which all other counter-
vailing moral claims are dwarfed. Consequently, claims of
human rights violations rhetorically work in a manner which
698 [Vol. XXIII:3
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is not unlike a holy war: as a claim of absolute righteousness
which ironically can come to operate at the expense of simple
decency. We can look at the asymmetry of the standard notion
of human rights and see this easily. For example, someone who
is homeless and begging on the streets, but has the right to
hire a lawyer for $300 an hour or buy network television time,
suffers no violation of his or her human rights. Or, for exam-
ple, economic sanctions are sometimes imposed on a country in
the name of the human rights of its citizens; despite the oppo-
sition of the citizens themselves and despite the fact that the
sanctions cause direct hardship, hunger and sickness to the
poorest and most fragile members of society.
Thus, I argue, the standard notion of human rights is in
some degree actually dangerous in that it invokes ethical prin-
ciples that it claims are not only universal, but absolute. At
the same time, because it implicitly asserts the most extreme
moral claim possible, it is not concerned merely with which
acts are wrong, but rather with distinction between absolute
righteousness and absolute evil. It can provide-and has on
certain occasions provided-a justification for doing violence or
inflicting suffering, if these take place on behalf of "human
rights," much the way that claims of righteousness have justi-
fied the bloodiest acts of holy wars.
I conclude by suggesting alternative models for human
rights which would address the problem of asymmetry and
would offer an account of human rights which is more coherent
philosophically and more consistent with our ethical intuitions.
But my central concern in this essay is not simply to propose a
more coherent model for the concept. Rather, I am deeply in-
terested in examining the relation between the concept and the
political interest; and in demonstrating that no purely abstract
choice is possible, only a fundamentally interested one. I sug-
gest that we might be well served by simply looking at the con-
ceptual and rhetorical means used in international relations by
which brutality is sometimes reconciled with claims of moral
righteousness. I suggest that absolute ethical claims-of which
the concept of human rights is an exemplar-are double-edged
and that absolute righteousness is not possible in the face of
political situations which are always and necessarily character-
ized by moral ambiguity.
I should mention that my interest in the concept of human
rights derives from my experiences in 1991 and 1992, when I
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spent a good deal of time living and traveling in Guatemala,
Nicaragua and Cuba. Although I had a strong academic back-
ground in both political philosophy and Latin America, I never-
theless found myself both deeply moved and deeply shaken. It
was not so much that I learned new "facts"--I had always
known, for example, that the infant mortality rate is a mea-
sure of development and that it is much higher in poor coun-
tries than wealthy countries. But I had never before been wok-
en at 3:00 AM by a neighbor building a coffin for his baby who
had died in the night for lack of $2 worth of medicine (which
happened in Nicaragua). Nor had I ever been to a public gar-
bage dump which contained an entire village made of garbage,
as I saw in Guatemala City-an entire shanty town made of
garbage, with women cutting their children's hair with broken
scissors picked from the garbage, old men sitting on mounds of
garbage and reading newspapers they had picked out of the
heaps, and teenage boys playing soccer on a field of garbage
with a torn soccer ball someone had thrown away.
I also got a bit of a sense of what it is like to live in a
place marked by state terrorism, also in Guatemala, when a
language teacher showed me the cigarette burns on his chest;
and when I saw soldiers armed with Uzis and M-16s guarding
not only the banks, but grocery stores, museums, bookstores
and libraries; and when I visited an academic research insti-
tute surrounded by 12-foot-high cement walls, inset with bro-
ken glass, topped with barbed wire running horizontally and
circled by razor wire.
As a result, at this point I have very strong views about
what some people describe as "merely" economic harm. Like-
wise, I have very strong views about the nature and kinds of
state violence and political intrusion, when it makes sense to
equate them, and when it does not. It is because of my experi-
ences and my views that I will now argue for a certain analysis
of human rights, which I hope will stand up to the scrutiny of
an academic community which does not necessarily share ei-
ther my views or my memories.
I. THE STANDARD CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The notion of human rights in general-as moral princi-
ples by which we can judge the legal acts of state-has its
roots in the Greek notion that there is a transcendental stan-
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dard of justice by which we measure the justness of particular
laws and states. 5 This view is articulated in the distinction
between universal law and particular laws; and the related
distinction between natural or divine law (that which is inher-
ently and absolutely just) and positive law (that which is artic-
ulated in the form of actual laws).
Particular law is that which each community lays down and
applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly
unwritten. Universal law is the law of nature. For there
really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural jus-
tice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those
who have no association or covenant with each other.6
There are unwritten laws of justice which are not enforced,
but exist permanently and without change. 7 Written laws
change often; universal laws--"the law of nature"-do not. One
may break a particular law and not act unjustly, if it is an
unjust law which does not fulfill its true purpose, which is to
do justice." Aristotle refers to Sophocles' Antigone, who de-
scribes natural law as follows:
Not of to-day or yesterday it is,
But lives eternal: none can date its birth. 9
The distinction between law (the acts of state) and justice
(the ideal by which we judge the goodness of the state), or
between particular laws and universal law, is the foundation of
the notion of human rights. It is the basis for the moral claim
by which we can justify passing judgment on a state's ac-
tions-given that the state is the source of law, the state by
definition determines what is legal and what is not. The only
moral justification by which those who are outside a state can
pass judgment on the validity of its acts lies in the claim of a
higher standard, or a universal law, or a conception of justice,
against which the acts and laws of a particular state can be
15. See, e.g., PLATO, REPUBLIC bk 1; Plato, Gorgias, in 1 PLATO, THE DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO 505 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1937) (1892).
16. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC bk 1, ch. 13 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. See also Sophocles Antigone, in I SOPHOCLES 187 (David Grene trans.
& ed., 2d ed. 1991).
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measured. Thus, "human rights" by definition are not con-
cerned about ordinary crimes, which are offenses against the
state. Rather, the conception of human rights necessarily con-
cerns acts (or failures to act) of the state; and necessarily
makes the claim that an act or policy which may be legal is
nevertheless unjust. This moral claim in turn provides a stan-
dard by which to judge the acts of a sovereign government to
be "criminal" in some sense and justifies the "punishment" of
other states, as well as interference in their internal policies.
The concept of human rights which is currently the stan-
dard or dominant concept is one which has been articulated in
approximately the same form in international law and diplo-
macy, by NGOs and in philosophical and theoretical literature.
The dominant concept of human rights entails: (1) the right to
be free from what are often called "atrocities," such as torture
and genocide; and (2) political and civil rights, including elec-
tions and judicial process and freedom of thought, speech and
press. The dominant concept of human rights does not include
economic rights, such as the rights to food, shelter and employ-
ment.
If by "human rights" we refer to those elements which
constitute the minimal conditions for human life, then we have
a problem: not being tortured or killed is essential for human
life, but running for political office is not. Thus, it is not clear
that we can justify placing civil and political rights in the same
category as the right not to be subject to atrocities. On the
other hand, food and shelter are minimal conditions for life. So
how did this dominant concept of human rights come to be
formulated?
In the twentieth century, the Nuremberg trials at the end
of World War II were perhaps the first significant attempt to
articulate and enforce (or rather penalize violations of) princi-
ples of human rights. ° At Nuremberg, from 1946 to 1949, the
20. There had, of course, been rules of war for many centuries. See discussion
infra Part III. There had even been a thin attempt to try individuals for war
crimes committed during World War I. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
articulated certain guidelines regarding "war crimes," including prohibitions on the
use of poisonous gas, the sinking of hospital ships, etc. At the close of World War
I, there was a pro forma attempt to bring the Kaiser to trial for initiating a war
of aggression and there were a few isolated trials of German soldiers, who were
acquitted or sentenced to short jail terms. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 12-20 (1992).
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Nazis were prosecuted by the Allied tribunal for war crimes,
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. "War
crimes" involved the violation of the rules of war, such as blan-
ket bombing in civilian areas, gratuitous attacks on civilian
populations of other nations and mistreatment of prisoners of
war.2' "Crimes against peace" consisted of waging a war of
aggression, or waging war in violation of treaties.22 Germany's
"crime against peace" was its military aggression against sov-
ereign nations. For both "crimes against peace" and "war
crimes" there was some precedent, albeit tenuous, for the no-
tion that a tribunal could legitimately claim jurisdiction over
claims brought for these two types of crimes since they in-
volved the violation of explicit conventions and treaties. How-
ever, the extermination of German Jews, gypsies, communists
and other groups constituted neither a war crime nor a crime
against peace. It was only under the third category, "crimes
against humanity," that a cognizable claim could be made
against a state for violence done to its own citizens by its offi-
cials in accordance with its own laws. "Crimes against humani-
ty" included genocide, enslavement, torture and racial or reli-
gious persecution.
21. 'War Crimes" were defined by the International Military Tribunal as
violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include,
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, kill-
ing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military neces-
sity.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(b), 59 Stat.
1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], reprinted in 1
SECRETARIAT OF THE TRIBUNAL, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 11 (1947)
[hereinafter OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIBUNAL].
22. "Crimes Against Peace" were defined as "planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Id. art. 6(a).
23. See TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 12-20.
24. "Crimes Against Humanity" were defined as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, wheth-
er or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
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Shortly after the Allied tribunal tried Nazi leaders on
charges of crimes against humanity, the notion of human
rights was incorporated in the charter of the newly-formed
United Nations (UN). The UN Charter, which entered into
force in 1945, provided that all signatory governments would
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms."' The Universal Declara-
tion, adopted in 1948,26 enumerated these rights, giving them
far broader meaning than the standards employed at
Nuremberg. Insofar as the Nuremberg notion of "crimes
against humanity" contains a conception of human rights, it is
a minimalist one: it primarily describes those acts which are
inconsistent with the minimum conditions for human life. By
contrast, the Universal Declaration is extremely broad. It pro-
vides that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty, and security
of person;"27 that "[n]o one shall be held in slavery;"28 that
"[aill are equal before the law;"29 that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."'0 It states that "[e]veryone is entitled ... to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribu-
nal in the determination of his rights and obligations and of
any criminal charge against him;"3 that everyone has the
"right to own property;"32 that everyone has the "right to a
nationality;"33 and that men and women have the "right to
marry and to found a family." 4 It provides that everyone has
the right to work;" that everyone has the right "to free choice
of employment,"36 and to "just and favourable conditions of
work;" 7 and that everyone has the right to "freedom of opin-
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
26. See Universal Declaration, supra note 14.
27. Id. art. 3, at 72.
28. Id. art. 4, at 73.
29. Id. art. 7, at 73.
30. Id. art. 5, at 73.
31. Id. art. 10, at 73.
32. Id. art. 17(1), at 74.
33. Id. art. 15(1), at 74.
34. Id. art. 16(1), at 74.
35. See id. art. 23, at 75.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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ion and expression,"38 "freedom of thought,"9 freedom of
"conscience," and freedom of "religion."41 Finally, it guaran-
tees that everyone has the "right to a standard of living ade-
quate for the health and well-being of himself and of his fami-
ly, including food, clothing, housing and medical care;"42 that
everyone has the "right to rest and leisure, including reason-
able limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with
pay;" that everyone has the right to education;" that every-
one has the right to free elementary education45 and to higher
education accessible to all on the basis of merit;46 and that
everyone has the right "to enjoy the arts and to share in scien-
tific advancement.'"7
The concept of human rights contained in the Universal
Declaration stands in marked contrast to the notion of human
rights contained in the Nuremberg notion of "crimes against
humanity." The notion of "crimes against humanity" was very
limited, in that it addressed one's right not to be subject to
behavior which was in some sense beyond the pale of civiliza-
tion. The concept of human rights in the Universal Declaration
is not a minimal standard of civilized decency, but rather an
extremely robust conception of the good. It seeks to identify
every dimension of human life and every type of human need
which must be met for an individual to have a rich and fulfill-
ing life-socially, politically, economically and culturally.
The Universal Declaration does not contain an enforce-
ment mechanism, or any specific binding obligations on the
signatory governments. According to the Preamble, the Univer-
sal Declaration is "a common standard of achievement," which
every individual and every organ of society shall "keep[ ...
constantly in mind."48 Nations shall strive to achieve this
standard, according to the Preamble, by "teaching and educa-
38. Id. art. 19, at 74.
39. Id. art. 18, at 74.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 25(1), at 76.
43. Id. art. 24, at 75.
44. See id. art. 26(1), at 76.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id. art. 27, at 76.
48. Id. preamble.
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tion" to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
"progressive measures" to secure their recognition.49
In the late 1940s and in the 1950s, other treaties were
generated which specifically concerned matters such as torture
and genocide.5" In the 1960s, the UN set about producing le-
gally binding documents and enforcement mechanisms ad-
dressing the rights enumerated in the Universal Declara-
tion.5 The elements of the Universal Declaration were refor-
mulated in two separate covenants: the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)52 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).53
49. Id.
50. Other major human rights documents include the following: Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Inter-
national Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apart-
heid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 245; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027. However, what is known as "the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights" consists of the Universal Declaration, supra note 14;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, SEN.
EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI; Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [here-
inafter Optional Protocol]; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, adopt-
ed Dec. 15, 1989, GA. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 206, U.N. Doc
A1441824 (1989).
51. For a discussion of the formulation of these covenants see Asbjorn Eide,
Strategies for the Realization of the Right to Food, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 3, at 460.
52. ICESCR, supra note 50.
53. ICCPR, supra note 50. Note that the European analogue has the same
structure. The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, established
by the Council of Europe, is based upon two treaties: the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European
Social Charter. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights] (including the right to life, the right not to be sub-
jected to torture, freedom of thought and expression and political and judicial
rights); European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (including the
right to work, the right to medical care, the right to safe and healthy working
conditions and the right to social welfare). Thus, the European human rights sys-
tem has the same bifurcated structure as the two United Nations (UN) covenants.
The mechanisms of enforcement for the European system likewise reiterate
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The ICCPR basically concerns two types of rights: those
pertaining to the physical integrity of the person, such as exe-
cution, torture and enslavement, and those pertaining to legal
proceedings, to the legal status of persons and to "intellectual"
rights, such as the right to hold and communicate one's ideas
and beliefs.54 The first category is concrete and substantive:
the same priorities as those contained in the UN covenants. Article 19 of the
European Convention on Human Rights provides for enforcement by two institu-
tions, the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra, art. 19. Under
Article 25, complaints of human rights violations under the Convention can be
brought by either individuals (where the state party recognizes the right of private
petition) or other states. See id. art. 25. Under Article 54, the Committee of Min-
isters is then charged with enforcing the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights. See id. art. 54.
The European Social Charter, on the other hand, establishes a set of aspi-
rations rather than explicit obligations. Part I of the Charter provides that the
state parties "accept as the aim of their policy, to be pursued by appropriate
means . . . the attainment of conditions in which [these] rights and principles may
be effectively realised." European Social Charter, supra, preamble, 529 U.N.T.S. at
92. The Charter has no mechanisms of enforcement analogous to those contained
in the Convention. The Charter only provides for a reporting system to monitor
the parties' progress toward these goals. The reports are reviewed by a set of
committees, which pass on their views to the Committee of Ministers, which in
turn may make "recommendations" to the parties. See id. arts. 25-27, 29, 529
U.N.T.S. at 116, 118.
54. The ICCPR provides, among other things, that the states which are par-
ties "undertake to ensure" the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of
all civil and political rights set forth in the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 3,
999 U.N.T.S. at 174. The ICCPR provides that "[e]very human being has the in-
herent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his life." Id. art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. The ICCPR provides
that the death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and only
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. See id. art. 6(2), 999
U.N.T.S. at 174. The ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected to torture, or
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. See id. art. 7, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175. The ICCPR provides that no one shall be held in slavery or in
servitude and that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are
established by law." Id. arts. 8-9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
The ICCPR further provides that anyone who is arrested shall be informed
at the time of arrest of the reasons for his arrest and that anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge. See id.
The ICCPR provides that all persons shall be equal before the courts; and that all
persons shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay. It provides that every
person has the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance; and
to have legal assistance assigned to him without payment by him, when justice
requires. See id. art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77. The ICCPR provides that every-
one shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and to
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when these rights are violated, individuals suffer concrete,
physical harm; and there are no formal procedures which can
legitimatize these acts. The second category is quite different.
For those rights concerned with the form of judicial and po-
litical proceedings, as long as there is due process and free
elections, the outcome by definition cannot constitute a viola-
tion of one's rights. Those rights concerning speech, press and
religious expression involve abstract entities-ideas, beliefs,
information and the exchange or dissemination of these.
There is also an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Optional
Protocol), adopted at the same time as the two covenants, 55
which concerns enforcement. Under the Optional Protocol,
individuals claiming a violation of rights under the ICCPR,
who have exhausted all available domestic remedies, may
submit a statement to the Human Rights Committee. "6 Under
the Optional Protocol, the Human Rights Committee shall then
bring such claims to the attention of the state party alleged to
be violating the covenant and the state party must within six
manifest his religion and belief in practice and teaching. See id. art. 18, 999
U.N.T.S. at 178. The ICCPR provides that everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference; and that everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression. See id. art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178. It provides that the freedom of
expression shall include "freedom to seek, receive and impart information... ,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other me-
dia of his choice." Id. The ICCPR provides that every citizen shall have the right
to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote and to be elected at elec-
tions. See id- art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. It provides that these elections shall be
based on universal and equal suffrage; and shall be held by secret ballot, "guaran-
teeing the free expression of the will of the electors." Id. The ICCPR provides that
all persons are entitled to the equal protection of the law, without discrimination;
and that "the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." Id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
Part IV of the ICCPR provides for the establishment of a Human Rights
Committee, whose members are nominated and elected by the state parties. See
id. arts. 28-30, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179-80. A state party may recognize the compe-
tence of the Human Rights Committee to hear claims of violations and may then
present a claim that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
ICCPR. See id. art. 41, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182. The Human Rights Committee is
then empowered to investigate and issue findings as to the claims made, if the
matter cannot be amicably resolved to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.
See id. arts. 41, 42, 999 U.N.T.S. at 182-83. The ICCPR states that the Secretary-
General of the UN shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the Commit-
tee to perform these functions. See id. art. 36, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
55. See Optional Protocol, supra note. 50.
56. See id. art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 302.
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months provide a written explanation or statement regarding
the remedial action taken by that state.57
The ICESCR, by contrast, addresses issues of food, shelter,
employment, health care and education." The degree of the
obligation varies to some extent with the different rights. For
example, the parties pledge to "undertake to ensure" the right
to form and participate in trade unions; 9 whereas they mere-
ly "recognize that ... [tihe widest possible protection and as-
sistance should be accorded to the family."" Unlike the
ICCPR, the ICESCR contains no mechanism to receive and
investigate claimed violations, originating either from states or
from individuals. The only form of enforcement consists of the
agreement of the state parties to submit reports "on the mea-
sures which they have adopted and the progress made in
achieving the observance of the rights recognized" by the cove-
nant.6 ' Unlike the ICCPR, the terms of the ICESCR contain
57. See id. art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 303.
58. The ICESCR provides that the signatory states recognize the right to
work, including the right of everyone to engage in work which he freely chooses or
accepts and that the parties "will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right."
ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 6(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6. The ICESCR provides that
the parties "recognize the right of everyone" to fair wages, a decent living for
themselves and their families, safe and healthy working conditions, rest, leisure
and periodic holidays with pay. Id. art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6. The ICESCR pro-
vides that the parties "undertake to ensure" the right of everyone to form and join
trade unions and the right to strike, in conformity with the laws of the state. Id.
art. 8, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6. The ICESCR provides that the parties recognize the
right of families to assistance for the care and education of children and paid
maternity leave. Id. art. 10,- 993 U.N.T.S. at 7. The ICESCR provides that the
parties recognize the right of everyone to adequate food, clothing and housing and
to the continuous improvement of living conditions. Id. art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
Under the ICESCR, the parties "shall take ...measures ...which are needed"
to improve methods of food production and distribution, including agrarian reform;
and "to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to
need." Id. The ICESCR provides that the states which are parties shall take those
steps necessary for the reduction of infant mortality, improvement of the environ-
ment and creation of conditions which would assure medical service to all in the
event of sickness. Id. art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8. The parties to the ICESCR "rec-
ognize the right of everyone" to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and to the protection of any benefits to be derived from their
literary, scientific, or artistic production. Id. art. 15, 993 U.N.T.S. at 9.
59. Id. art. 8(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
60. Id. art. 10(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
61. Id. arts. 16(1), 17(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9. Parties may indicate in these
reports the factors and difficulties affecting the fulfillment of the obligations of the
covenant. See id. art. 17(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9. These reports are to be submitted
to the Secretary-General of the UN, who then transmits them to the Economic
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no agreement to immediately implement the rights identified
in the covenant, but rather to work toward their "progressive
implementation." 2
Thus, the contents of the Universal Declaration were refor-
mulated in 1966 in the form of two instruments, one concerned
with overt state violence, civil and political rights, and rights
of belief and expression; the other concerned with social, eco-
nomic and cultural rights. The ICCPR contains a procedure for
addressing complaints of violations, while the ICESCR has no
comparable procedure. The ICCPR provides that the parties
shall conform fully to its provisions immediately; the ICESCR
provides that parties shall take steps to achieve these rights
"to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization" of social and eco-
nomic rights." Thus, there is a significant difference between
the two covenants as to the expectations of compliance and the
mechanisms for enforcement. The ICCPR "has teeth" in ways
that the ICESCR does not. The ICCPR has explicit require-
ments, explicit prohibitions and a procedure for responding to
acts of a state party that violate these requirements and prohi-
bitions. The ICESCR, on the other hand, may be immediately
binding, but what is binding is an aspirational standard: the
ICESCR provides an ideal goal which the parties must work
toward, but not necessarily achieve. How hard they work to-
ward this goal is a matter they determine for themselves, in
accordance with their resources and their national priorities.
Thus, under the ICESCR there is no standard, even in princi-
ple, by which another nation or outside organization can judge
the validity of a nation's economic priorities. In short, under
the ICCPR it is both possible and expected that parties shall
comply; while the ICESCR anticipates that state parties will
de facto determine for themselves what constitutes compliance
and that noncompliance will not be challenged or penalized."
and Social Council. The Economic and Social Council in turn may respond with
comments or recommendations. See id. arts. 16-22,, 993 U.N.T.S. at 9-10. The Eco-
nomic and Social Council may transmit these reports to the Commission on Hu-
man Rights "for study and general recommendations" or "for information." Id. art.
19, 993 U.N.T.S. at 10.
62. Id. art. 22, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
63. Id. art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 (emphasis added).
64. However, as Jack Donnelly notes, both sets of rights are essential and
interrelated. Donnelly notes that "a] long string of resolutions proclaim this [that
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Why were the provisions of the Universal Declaration
reformulated in this manner? Why is there such a dramatic
difference between the enforcement provisions of the two cove-
nants?
At the time the covenants were being drafted, several
arguments were put forth justifying the disparity. First, it was
maintained that political rights could be implemented immedi-
ately, while economic rights could be implemented only gradu-
ally. The argument was made that respecting political rights
requires no substantial state expenditures, whereas meeting
the economic needs of a population requires substantial eco-
nomic outlays.65 However, this argument is not persuasive.
There are substantial costs involved in operating a judiciary
system that protects the due process rights of defendants,
particularly since under such a system they may be entitled to
have counsel provided by the state. At the same time, there
are social and economic rights the implementation of which
does not require that the state provide subsidies out of pocket.
This would include minimum wage standards, parental leave
requirements, the right to form trade unions, child labor laws,
agrarian reform, environmental protection and anti-trust regu-
is, that all human rights are interdependent and indivisible], most notably UN
General Assembly [Rlesolution 32/130, as well as an agenda item at the 41st Gen-
eral Assembly." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRAc-
TICE 28, n.1 (1989). Many commentators have held that the two sets of rights are
both necessary--or are interdependent, or complementary-without resolving the
conflicts that arise, or the relative priority that should be given particular rights
or sets of rights. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 1; Steiner, supra note 12, at 928;
see also generally Melanie Beth Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which
are More Fundamental?, 40 EMORY L.J. 911, 915-16 (1991); Connie de la Vega,
Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 471, 471-72
(1994).
65. See Asbjorn Eide, Strategies for the Realization of the Right to Food, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 3, at 460.
For example, Hugo Bedau makes this argument in his discussion of Section
502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994), which makes
foreign assistance conditional upon the recipient country's human rights practices:
A government may in fact be unable to do anything about the starvation
of a good portion of its population; but a government is never unable to
prohibit (and to that extent, end) the practice of torturing suspects ....
The government's responsibility to undertake to feed its own people re-
mains less central than its responsibility not to torture.
Hugo Adam Bedau, Human Rights and Foreign Assistance Programs, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 37 (Peter G. Brown & Douglas MacLean eds.,
1979).
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It was also argued that because civil and political rights
only entail that the state abstain from action, it is reasonable
to expect complete and immediate compliance; while such an
expectation would not be reasonable regarding social and eco-
nomic rights, which require the state to affirmatively under-
take certain actions.17 However, under the Nuremberg princi-
ples, state officials can be guilty of human rights violations for
their acquiescence or failures to act. 8 A state which consents
or acquiesces to acts of genocide or torture by paramilitary
death squads, for example, may be deemed to be in violation of
human rights for its failure to intervene. Thus, the human
right of freedom from torture in fact requires not only that the
state abstain from torturing individuals, but that it act affir-
matively to prohibit and prevent non-state actors from engag-
ing in these practices. Civil and political rights are neither
self-generating nor free of costs; they "need legislation, promo-
tion and protection and this requires resources."69
66. One scholar, Jeremy Waldron, notes that civil and political rights entail
positive duties to act, as well as duties of omission. Waldron further points out
that these duties stem from economic rights as well:
The right not to be tortured generates a duty not to torture people, but
it also generates a duty to investigate complaints of torture, a duty to
pay one's share for the political and administrative setups that might be
necessary to prevent torture and so on. As far as second-generation
rights are concerned, they too may be correlated with duties that are
positive or negative, depending on the context. If people are actually
starving, their rights make a call on our active assistance, but if they
are living satisfactorily in a traditional subsistence economy, the right
may require we simply refrain from any action that could disturb that
state of affairs. We talk sometimes as though it only happens by misfor-
tune that people are starving and that the only issue rights raise in the
matter is whether we should put ourselves out and come to their aid.
But people often starve as a result of what we do as well as what we
don't do.
WALDRON, supra note 7, at 25. Also relevant is Aart Hendriks discussion of nega-
tive and positive rights and the distinction between "obligation of conduct" and
"obligation of result." Hendriks, supra note 12, at 1132-33 (1995). The distinction
between positive and negative rights has been applied in numerous areas. See,
e.g., Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human
Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119, 1143 (1995) (applying the negative and posi-
tive rights distinction to issues concerning domestic violence).
67. See discussion infra Part VII.
68. See discussion infra Part VII.
69. Dilys M. Hill, Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Theoretical Foundations,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (Dilys M. Hill ed., 1989). As one com-
mentator points out:
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The bifurcation of the rights articulated in the Universal
Declaration was also justified by a pragmatic argument: that a
covenant of civil and political rights, which only requires ab-
stention from certain acts rather than the affirmative imple-
mentation of policies, would be more easily ratified than a
document which required affirmative commitment of resources
from state parties. 7' However, this has not proven to be the
case.7' As of January 1998, there were 137 parties to the
lilt was widely believed that compliance with civil and political rights
was cost-free, whereas the realization of social rights posed an economic
burden on the State. This argument also turned out to be unfounded.
The organization of presidential or parliamentary elections, for example,
may in fact be extremely expensive, while there are many preventive
health measures that can be implemented at low or no cost.
Hendriks, supra note 12, at 1133.
70. These arguments continue to be made by commentators in the field of
human rights. Marc Bossuyt, for instance, writes that:
Civil rights require from the State essentially-but not exclusively-an
abstention. Consequently, they must be observed immediately, totally and
universally. On the contrary, social rights require an active intervention
from the State. As a result, they may be implemented progressively,
partially and selectively. It is precisely because observance of civil rights
merely requires abstention that States have no excuse for not respecting
human rights of everyone within its jurisdiction. On the other hand,
because the implementation of social rights requires an active interven-
tion by the State to the extent of its available resources-a State can be
allowed to set priorities in the realization of social rights.
Marc Bossuyt, International Human Rights Systems: Strengths and Weaknesses, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 3, at 52. Bossuyt con-
tends that this distinction-between a requisite state abstention necessary to se-
cure civil rights and the need for active state intervention to implement social
rights-is reflected in the allocation of responsibilities for rights among the judicia-
ry on the one hand and the administrative and political departments on the other.
As Bossuyt writes:
This is also the reason why the control of the observance of civil rights
can be entrusted to judicial bodies, while the control of the implementa-
tion of social rights is left to administrative or political bodies. Indeed, in
spite of the often very general and vague formulations of civil rights, a
judge-national or international-is able to decide whether or not civil
rights have been observed in a specific case .... On the other hand,
without further elaboration by national or regional legislation, no judge is
in a position to rule whether in a specific case a State has fulfilled its
obligations in the field of social rights, because--depending on the avail-
able resources-it is up to each State to decide which social rights should
be implemented first and which citizens should be first entitled to the
benefits of those rights.
Id.
71. According to one commentator, Asbjorn Eide:
Following the adoption of the Universal Declaration in 1948, the United
Nations set about adopting legally binding instruments, and decided in
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ICESCR and 140 parties to the ICCPR 2
International banking institutions, such as the World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, adopt the same distinction." The most prominent hu-
man rights NGOs structure their institutional priorities in the
same way. 4 Amnesty International's mandate is to "contrib-
the process to make a distinction between two sets of rights: the civil
and political which were incorporated into [I]CCPR, and the economic,
social and cultural rights which were incorporated into [I]CESCR ....
Two major reasons were used in favour of their separation. One
was the claim that the two sets of rights needed different kinds of imple-
mentation approaches at the national level. It has frequently been argued
that the civil and political rights can be implemented immediately and
without cost, whereas the economic and social rights can be implemented
only gradually, and with cost ....
The second claim, relating more to political considerations, was
that many States might be willing to ratify the [I]CCPR but not the
[I]CESCR. By separating them into two documents, States which had
problems in implementing economic and social rights could nevertheless
undertake binding obligations in regard to civil and political rights by
ratifying the [I]CCPR. Empirical reality has shown this to be wrong. In
practically all cases, States have ratified both Covenants. In those very
few cases where States have ratified only one covenant, it has been the
[I]CESCR, not the [I]CCPR. As of March 1990, there is no case in which
a state has ratified the [I]CCPR but not the [I]CESCR.
The only candidate likely to ratify the [I]CCPR but not the
[I]CESCR would be the United States, which stands out as a very special
case.
Eide, supra note 65, at 460-61 (referring to the AVOR and the ICESCR).
Indeed, as of 1997, only one country, the United States, has ratified only
the VER. The United States did not ratify the CR until 1992 and has not yet
ratified the ICESCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Website (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http'//www.unhchr.ch>.
72. See United Nations Treaty Collection (visited Jan. 19, 1998)
<<http://www.un.org/depts/treaty>>.
73. See John Linarelli The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INTVL BUS. L. 373, 400 (1995) (discussing
the notion of "rights" and "the taxonomy of human rights" employed in interna-
tional banking institutions).
74. See Makau wa Mutua, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Aboli-
tionist Paradigm in Africa, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 591, 605 (1996) (review of CLAUDE
E. WELCH, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995)). Mutua discusses the civil liberties
origins of the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), as opposed to
the domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Third World countries
whose primary commitment is often economic rights or self-determination rather
than civil rights.
INGOs are based almost exclusively in the West even though the bulk of
their work is directed at the South ... INGOs are the ideological off-
spring of Western domestic NGOs such as the ACLU and the ...
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ute to the observance throughout the world of human rights as
set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," by
seeking the release of those who are imprisoned because of
their beliefs or because of their race, ethnicity, or gender; by
opposing the detention of prisoners of conscience or political
prisoners whose trial did not conform to certain norms for
judicial procedure; and by opposing the death penalty, torture
and other cruel and degrading punishments. 5 Thus, despite
NAACP Legal Defense and Education fund .... Although the NAACP
has also focused on questions of social and economic justice, both orga-
nizations rest their moral authority on a narrow range of civil and politi-
cal rights. None challenge or question the fundamental character of eco-
nomic and social structures and their underling philosophies and assump-
tions; they seek fair and equal treatment within the framework of the
American liberal market economic arrangements. Leading INGOs, such as
HRW, Amnesty International and ICJ promote similar ideals abroad.
Id. (citations omitted). Mutua notes that the individuals connected to the ACLU,
including a former executive director, were prominent in the formation of Ameri-
can and British INGOs, including Human Rights Watch, International League for
Human Rights and Amnesty International. Id. at 606. Furthermore, the Western-
based INGOs have considerably more access to resources and public recognition
than the domestic human rights NGOs in Third World countries. "INGOs," Mutua
observes,
derive financial, social, and moral support from [Western] philanthropists,
foundations, and citizens; they enjoy access to "world" political centers,
such as New York, London, Washington, Paris, and Geneva; they utilize
the resources and ability of United Nations and regional human rights
systems; they have access to the all-powerful Western media; and they
have access to and, quite often, cooperation from the arms of government
concerned with foreign affairs. In contrast, even the most visible human
rights NGOs in the South operate at the bare margins of these struc-
tures.
Id. at 606. See also HENRY J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 19 (1991) (observing that the
term "First World NGOs" are "those committed to traditional Western liberal val-
ues associated with the origins of the human rights movement.").
75. Article 1 of the Statute of Amnesty International provides that the organi-
zation "adopts as its mandate:"
To promote awareness of and adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other internationally recognized human rights instru-
ments, the values enshrined in them, and the indivisibility and interde-
pendence of all human rights and freedoms;
To oppose grave violations of the rights of every person freely to hold
and to express his or her convictions and to be free from discrimination
by reason of ethnic origin, sex, colour or language, and of the right of
every person to physical and mental integrity, and, in particular, to op-
pose by all appropriate means irrespective of political considerations:
a) the imprisonment, detention or other physical restrictions im-
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Amnesty International's claimed commitment to "the obser-
vance of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," in fact its substantive commitment is to some of those
provisions: those relating to the physical integrity of individu-
als (such as torture and execution); those relating to civil and
political rights (such as judicial process, elections and freedom
of belief and expression). While Amnesty International does
not explicitly reject the notion of economic rights, 6 it does not
identify, investigate, or address in any manner those actions or
failures to act which would constitute violations of economic
rights.
Amnesty International does not "take a stand on the legiti-
macy of military, economic, and cultural relations maintained
with countries where human rights are violated, or on punitive
measures such as sanctions or boycotts." Nor does it "address
posed on any person by reason of his or her political, religious or
other conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of his or her ethnic
origin, sex, colour or language, provided that he or she has not
used or advocated violence (hereinafter referred to as "prisoners of
conscience"); Amnesty International shall work towards the release
of and shall provide assistance to prisoners of conscience;
b) the detention of any political prisoner without fair trial within a
reasonable time or any trial procedures relating to such prisoners
that do not conform to internationally recognized norms;
c) the death penalty, and the torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners or other detained
or restricted persons, whether or not the persons affected have
used or advocated violence;
Statute of Amnesty International, art. 1, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1995
327 (1995).
76. Thomas Hamnarberg, a chairman of the International Executive Commit-
tee of Amnesty International, noted that Amnesty International is deeply commit-
ted to political prisoners and it is also
deeply involved in combatting torture and the death penalty, and in
working for fair trials and improved prison conditions. This focus certain-
ly does not mean that Amnesty International downgrades other basic
rights, such as the social and economic ones. These are often related to
the political and civil rights. Neither would Amnesty International at-
tempt to create a conflict between civil and political rights on the one
hand and socio-economic rights on the other. That approach would be
false. The Universal Declaration is quite clear in stating that both are
needed. Often they complement one another: when those deprived of their
socio-economic rights cannot make their voices heard, they are even less
likely to have their needs met.
Thomas Haromarberg, Preface to Chapter 5, Non-Governmental Organisations, in 3
JAMES AvERY JOYCE, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 1559-60 (1978).
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itself to the general economic or political system in any coun-
try, only to that country's observance of human rights within
Amnesty International's mandate."
71
Human Rights Watch and its offshoots78 likewise have a
mandate which addresses state violations of the physical integ-
rity of individuals (torture, kidnapping and execution) and
political and civil rights (judicial process, free elections, free-
dom of belief and expression). Human Rights Watch "defends
freedom of thought and expression, due process of law and
equal protection of the law; it documents and denounces mur-
ders, disappearances, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, exile,
censorship and other abuses of internationally recognized hu-
man rights."79
The same two-tier notion of human rights has also been.
adopted by various individual governments, perhaps in its
most extreme form by the United States. The United States
has followed a curious path in its espousal of human rights
principles. On one hand, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Four
Freedoms" included "freedom from want" as well as political
freedom."0 The United States then had a leading role in both
lhe Nuremberg tribunals" and the drafting of the Universal
Declaration.82 Since the Carter Administration, it has been
commonplace to hear references to human rights in foreign
policy discussions in the United States." Since the end of the
77. THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 129 (Marie Staunton et al. eds.,
1991).
78. Human Rights Watch began with the founding of Helsinki Watch in 1978
and now includes Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Middle East Watch
and other human rights projects. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST AGENDA:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN FIELD OPERATIONS i (1993).
79. Id.
80. See Frank C. Newman, United Nations Human Rights Covenants and the
United States Government: Diluted Promises, Foreseeable Futures, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1241, 1242 n.7 (1993).
81. See discussion infra Part VII.
82. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing the U.S. role in the postwar
formulation of international legal instruments and treaties).
83. Although the Carter Administration is most widely recognized for making
human rights a centerpiece of foreign policy, human rights have at least formally
been a foreign policy priority since the early 1960s. The U.S. concern with human
rights was reflected in the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16,
22 and 42 U.S.C.). Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, pro-
vides that the United States shall "promote and encourage increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction
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Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, "human rights"
has become one of the central principles invoked in the justifi-
cation of U.S. foreign policy.' However, the United States has
been one of the slowest nations in the world to ratify the major.
human rights instruments.85 It has not yet ratified and does
not abide by the ICESCR. 5
as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign
policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of inter-
nationally recognized human rights by all countries." 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1994).
84. Since 1990, human rights have been invoked to justify U.S. interventions
in Haiti and Somalia and U.S. support of United Nations intervention in Bosnia;
human rights violations were one of the justifications given for the Persian Gulf
War, human rights claims have justified the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba; and
human rights violations have been raised to criticize U.S. military and financial
support of Guatemala. See, e.g., The President's News Conference, 27 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 39 (Jan. 12, 1991) (press conference of President George H.W.
Bush, contending that, throughout United States history, "we've been resolute in
our support of justice, freedom, and human dignity. The current situation in the
Persian Gulf demands no less of us and of the international community."); Message
to Congress on Haiti, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 185 (Feb. 3, 1995) (message of
President William J. Clinton, citing the expulsion of human rights observers as
among the factors which precipitated the international intervention in Haiti);
Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with International Law
and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 289, 305 (1997).
85. See Glendon, supra note 10, at 521 (observing that the United States is
notable for its "conspicuous unwillingness . . . to ratify several important interna-
tional human rights instruments to which all other liberal democracies have acced-
ed."). Similarly, Vega notes that the U.S. position "contradict[s] the vast authority
in the international community which maintains that the enjoyment of both sets of
rights is indivisible and interdependent." Vega, supra note 64, at 471-72.
86. See Stark, supra note 12, at 81-82. Stark identifies two justifications for
the nonadherence of the United States to the ICESCR:
First, it has been suggested that the rights set forth in the Covenant are
"foreign" to our notion of rights. It has been argued that the Covenant
represents aspirations, as distinguished from "real," enforceable, civil or
political rights. During the Cold War, the U.S. Department of State
viewed ICESCR as a socialist manifesto thinly veiled in the language of
rights. It is settled that such rights are not protected under the U.S.
Constitution.
Second, political leaders have maintained that the concerns ad-
dressed by ICESCR are within the exclusive authority of the states, and
national adoption would infringe on state sovereignty.
Id. See also Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 A. J, INT'L L.
365, 366-67 (1990) (examining barriers to U.S. ratification of the ICESCR). Anoth-
er commentator, Feisal Naqvi notes that the United States "partially justified its
withdrawal from [UNESCO] on the basis [of] UNESCO's emphasis on economic
rights." Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the
Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND. L.J. 673, 713
(1996).
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Thus, the bifurcated notion of human rights-which treats
both atrocities and political rights as essential, while treating
economic rights as irrelevant or relatively trivial-is at present
the only notion of human rights which is explicitly adopted and
enforced in any fashion at all in the domains of international
law, international diplomacy and NGOs. It is also a notion
-which has been widely maintained and defended among com-
mentators on human rights as well, although there is consider-
ably more diversity among the academic treatments of human
rights than there is to be found in law, diplomacy and activist
organizations.
Among political philosophers, one of the early defenders of
the dominant notion of human rights is Maurice Cranston. In
his influential critique of the Universal Declaration, Cranston
argued that the criteria for determining what constitutes hu-
man rights are "practicability" and "paramount importance.""7
It is more practical to assert the existence of political rights
than economic rights, he suggests: political rights "can be
readily secured by legislation," whereas economic and social
rights can rarely, if ever, be secured by legislation alone.
Cranston points out that the legislation by which political
rights are secured is more straightforward than that needed
for economic rights. Often political rights can be achieved by
restraining governmental conduct.88
Thus, Cranston argues, it is practical to articulate and
enforce political rights and impractical to articulate and en-
force socioeconomic rights. Cranston ridicules the notion of
economic rights by focusing on one right included in the Uni-
versal Declaration which seems relatively frivolous: the right
to holidays with pay.89 "At present," Cranston writes, "it is
utterly impossible, and will be for a long time yet, to provide
'holidays with pay' for everybody in the world. For millions of
people who live in those parts of Asia, Africa, and South Amer-
ica, where industrialisation has hardly begun, such claims are
vain and idle.""
87. MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 66, 67 (1973).
88. See id. at 66.
89. See Universal Declaration, supra note 14, art. 24 (providing that
"[elveryone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of
working hours and periodic holidays with pay.").
90. CRANSTON, supra note 87, at 66.
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The second test "of a human right, or universal moral
right," Cranston writes, "is the test of paramount importance."
As Cranston explains, "[lit is a paramount duty to relieve great
distress, as it is not a paramount duty to give pleasure,"
Common sense knows that fire engines and ambulances are
essential services, whereas fun fairs and holiday camps are
not. Liberality and kindness are reckoned moral virtues; but
they are not moral duties in the sense that the obligation to
rescue a drowning child is a moral duty.9
Although in recent years, some models have been proffered
by philosophers and political theorists which do not fully reit-
erate this dichotomy, 2 this is still the most commonly held
contemporary notion of human rights as it has emerged in the
second half of the twentieth century.
Thus, the conception of human rights, as it has been for-
mulated in the international and diplomatic arena in the twen-
tieth century, has undergone a series of radical transforma-
tions. In the Nuremberg trials, the concept of "crimes against
humanity" was defined in terms of the failure to meet minimal
ethical obligations to human beings, by engaging in "murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or dur-
ing war.""' Three years later, the 1948 Universal Declaration
defined human rights not only in terms of extermination and
torture, but as an entitlement to all that which is necessary for
a full and complete life in every dimension of human exis-
tence-economically, socially, politically and culturally. Howev-
er, the Universal Declaration had no mechanism for enforce-
ment. Twenty years later, the 1966 covenants then divided the
"human rights" of the Universal Declaration into two catego-
ries, with a clear hierarchy. Civil and political rights consisted
of entitlements to judicial and political processes, belief and
91. Id. at 67.
92. Donnelly discusses some of the other models which, to some extent, identi-
fy other sets of basic rights. Fouad Ajami's core rights would be survival, protec-
tion against torture and apartheid and food; Henry Shue's would be security, sub-
sistence and liberty. See DONNELLY, supra note 64, at 38-41; see also generally
WALDRON, supra note 7 (setting forth several essays reformulating the problem
from a liberal perspective).
93. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S.
at 288.
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expression, as well as freedom from torture, enslavement and
execution-and the covenant regarding civil and political rights
contained mechanisms for both investigation and enforcement.
The covenant regarding social and economic rights to work,
health care, food, shelter and education contained no compara-
ble mechanism for investigation or enforcement. This two-tier
formulation of human rights, which is now the dominant one
in diplomacy and international law, was adopted in turn by the
most prominent non-governmental organizations, including
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and has
been defended by philosophers and political theorists.
II. THE ODDNESS OF THE CONCEPT
Let us look at four sets of implications of this formulation
of the concept of human rights.
A. Example One
Imagine two scenarios. In the first, military personnel go
to the home of a woodcutter. He is not home, but his mother,
wife and four young children are. When the woodcutter re-
turns, he finds the women and children decapitated. The torsos
have been seated around the table, with the head of each
placed on the table in front of the torso. The arms of each torso
are extended forward, the hands resting on top of the head.
The arms of the youngest child are too short to rest on top of
his head; his hands are nailed to the head, to hold them in
place. The executions committed by the soldiers constitute a
human rights violation.
In the second scenario, a political activist lives in a coun-
try with a single political party, which is center-right. The
activist is strongly committed to principles of economic equality
and social justice and believes that capitalism is both morally
wrong and historically doomed. The single political party and
all of its candidates are committed to a free-market economic
ideology, the privatization of education and health care, and
the elimination of all government subsidies for the poor. In the
upcoming election, there is only one presidential candidate. In
local elections, there are multiple candidates, but all are from
the same party. The activist is furious and frustrated at the
lack of choice. Although he has the right to vote, he feels disen-
franchised because there are no parties representing his views.
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This is a violation of his human rights.
Under the dominant conception, one's rights as a citizen
have the same standing as one's right not to be subject to cruel
and extremely violent acts. Thus, under the dominant concep-
tion, the right not to have one's children hacked to death has
the same status as the right to choose between Republicans
and Democrats.
B. Example Two
Your human rights have been violated if:
* you can only vote for a candidate from the Republican
Party;
* the law does not allow you an unlimited right to buy all
the television time you can afford;
* the government requires you to wait your turn to go to
Aruba for vacation.
No human rights have been violated if:
* your neighbor freezes to death for lack of heat;
* your infant daughter dies because you could not afford a
doctor;
• your teenage children are illiterate;
* begging on the street is the most lucrative form of employ-
ment you can find.
The dominant conception of human rights ensures that
individuals can express political views and pursue certain
personal interests-activities which may be satisfying or im-
portant, but are not essential for human life. However, the
dominant conception does not include any rights that are eco-
nomic in nature, even if these concern actual physical survival,
physical hunger, pain, helplessness and humiliation.94
94. This is a point that has been made by numerous commentators. See, e.g.,
Butcher, supra note 10, at 445 (contending that "civil and political human rights,
such as the right of free speech, only make sense to the person with basic eco-
nomic rights."). Butcher observes that "[a] mother whose baby is dying of disease
which he succumbed to because of debilitating diarrhea caused by massive mal-
nutrition-and half the babies in AFRICA die before they are one for just this
reason-would have little comprehension of our insistence on free speech as the
[Vol. XXIII:3
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Thus, the dominant conception has a curious structure: it
gives the same status to political and civil rights-including
those which enhance one's life, but are not necessary for sur-
vival-as it does to the rights relating to extreme acts of physi-
cal brutality. At the same time, it excludes economic rights,
even those which have implications for life and death, or the
necessities required for basic health and physical safety.95
C. Example Three
Let us assume, with the dominant conception, that our
human rights include the right to vote in free elections, the
right to hold public office, the right to due process of law and
the right to equal treatment and equal protection of the law.
Given this assumption, there are no violations of our hu-
man rights where:
* the law permits everyone-rich and poor alike-to spend
the $12 million necessary to run for Congress;
* the law forbids everyone-rich and poor alike-to beg on
the streets.96
fundamental right." Id. at 446. See also Bondzie-Simpson, supra note 10, at 658.
Bondzie-Simpson refers to the following quote from an unnamed African political
leader:
Imperialists talk about human rights, drinking tea or sipping champagne.
They can afford to-after all, they have made it. If we had slaves for
two hundred (200) years to build our roads, build our homesteads, sow
our fields; if we had multinationals for three hundred (300) years looting
wealth from other people's lands; if we had literate, healthy, well-fed citi-
zens-if we had a diversified economy and people had jobs--we too could
talk human rights from our air conditioned offices and houses.
Id.
95. This issue can also be framed in terms of the dual nature of property
rights. R. Andrew Painter offers the insight that:
the right to property can be viewed from two perspectives: that of the
landed and that of the landless. From the perspective of the landed, the
right to property is a civil right, one intended to ensure protection
against arbitrary State interference. From the perspective of the landless,
the right to property is an economic and social right, a prerequisite to
the fulfillment of other guaranteed human rights, such as the right to
life and an adequate standard of living. Under the latter perspective,
there is a positive State duty to ensure that sufficient lands are available
to all.
R. Andrew Painter, Property Rights of Returning Displaced Persons: The Guatema-
lan Experience, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 145, 167 (1996).
96. I am of course appropriating the famous dictum of Anatole France, that
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Under the dominant conception, political equality is a
human right. Yet political equality is purely formal: the fact
that all citizens of a certain age have the right to hold public
office does not mean that substantively they have the means to
do so. Political equality-the formal equality of all citizens in
relation to government and to law-does not entail economic
equality-substantively having the means to exercise one's
political rights.
The dominant conception of human rights attributes great
value to rights which are formal and abstract, or which are not
self-standing, and for that reason are quite worthless to many.
What is it that we have when we have the right to run for
office, to start a newspaper, to buy television time-without
the money necessary for each of these things? If I do not have
$12 million and I do not receive $12 million in campaign con-
tributions-what exactly is it that I have, then, if I have the
right to run for Congress? What do I have when I have a right
which is purely formal? What I have is either a promise of a
very limited sort, or it is simply and entirely an abstraction.
If it is a promise, then it is the promise regarding the
concrete and direct activities of the state. The promise is: if I
have the inclination-and the funds-to run for public office,
the state will not intervene to prevent me from doing so. If I
want to buy television time-and can afford to-the state will
n6t prevent me from doing so. If I am arrested, the state will
not prevent me from hiring a competent and thorough law-
yer-if I can afford to pay for her. If I and my organization
contribute $100,000 to the Democratic National Committee and
my Democratic senator is then willing to spend two hours
meeting with me, the state will not prevent me from lobbying
for laws that will serve my interests. If a political right is a
promise, then it is a promise regarding the limitations on the
state's intervention in how people make use of their resources.
Thus, it is the equal right of all to make use of resources,
where those resources are distributed unequally.
Yet if we want to consider political rights to be human
rights, we must maintain that there is something which all
persons have-not just the wealthy-when they have these
"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE
RED LiLY 87 (1894).
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rights. What is it that I have, exactly, when I have the right to
start a newspaper but not the means? What is it that I have
when I, who earn $5 an hour, have the right to lobby my sena-
tor who will not spend more than five minutes with someone
who has not contributed $1000 to his campaign? When I can-
not afford to buy television time, ad space, or the time and
attention of my governmental representatives, what exactly
does it mean to say that I have "the same" political rights as
someone who contributes $50,000 to the Democratic Party, or a
corporation which loans one of its jets to a presidential candi-
date to use during his campaign? In exactly what sense are my
rights "equal" or "the same?"
What exactly does it mean to say that I "have" a
right-which cannot be exercised? Let's say that I have a cou-
pon for 10% off on any mink coat I buy for a retail price of
$10,000 or more. But perhaps I earn only $5 per hour working
at a fast food restaurant. What is the "right" that I "have"
when I have an entitlement I cannot possibly actualize? What
would I be missing if someone took away my coupon for the
mink coat? Would my life be less rich? Would I live in more
pain or fear? In fact, my life would be no different. I would not
be any happier or less happy. I would not be in more pain or
less pain. I would not be doing anything different in my life
with possession of the coupon than I would without it. Is this
so different from the right to buy television air time? Or to
start a newspaper in competition with the New York Times?
Or the right to travel to foreign countries? How can one have
"essential rights" which are of no use to someone who does not
have the necessary resources to exercise them? How can some-
thing be absolutely essential for every human being-and also
quite worthless to those who are not wealthy?
D. Example Four
Since 1960, the United States has maintained an economic
embargo against Cuba, actively interfering in Cuba's commer-
cial relations with third-party nations. This embargo has pre-
vented Cuban purchases of medicine, medical equipment, wa-
ter purification chemicals, bicycles, soap, rice and milk. The
justification that the United States gives for this policy is that
the Cuban government violates the human rights of the Cuban
people. The human rights of the Cuban people are violated, it
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is held, in that they do not have freedom of speech and press;
that there is not a multi-party electoral system; that there has
only been one candidate for president since the revolution; and
that there are not certain rights of due process. Partly as a
result of the economic embargo, malnutrition has increased;
there have been severe shortages of electricity, public transpor-
tation and school supplies; the water is no longer consistently
potable; and there has been a measurable increase in prevent-
able deaths.
United States interference with Cuban trade has been
justified as an ethical measure, intended to destabilize Fidel
Castro's leadership and replace socialism with a "less repres-
sive" government that will not violate the human rights of the
Cuban people." In this case, the purported human rights vio-
lations include no "atrocities"-death squads, torture, genocide,
or enslavement. The claimed human rights violations involve
press, speech, religious expression, electoral practices and
judicial process."I Because civil and political rights are
deemed to be "human rights," and economic rights are not, we
see the ethically problematic situation in which "human rights"
are invoked to justify the infliction of concrete, immediate
physical suffering, by economic means, upon those members of
society who are the most vulnerable and the least responsible
for governmental policies-the elderly, the ill and the very
young.
E. Examples Analyzed
I use these examples to raise four conceptual issues re-
garding human rights: (1) the inclusion of civil and political
rights as human rights; (2) the exclusion of economic rights
97. See, e.g., the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994) (find-
ing, inter alia, that "[t]here is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to make
any significant concessions to democracy," and that "it is appropriate for" the Unit-
ed States and its allies "to cooperate ...to promote a peaceful [political] transi-
tion in Cuba."); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
22 U.S.C.A. § 6021 (West Supp. 1997) (finding, inter alia, that "the repression of
the Cuban people ... [has] isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely
nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere," and that the "Cuban peo-
ple deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has op-
pressed them for 36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically
improper conduct by the international community.").
98. See, e.g., 1996 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1996).
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from the conception of human rights; (3) the circumstances in
which "human rights" are abstractions without concrete value;
and (4) the consequences of this structure, whereby human
suffering may actually be increased in the name of human
rights.
If by the term "human rights" we want to somehow cap-
ture those elements essential to human life, then there is a
problem; some are essential to human life, while others con-
cern enrichment or happiness, but are by no means essential.
Death squads and genocide, both of them human rights viola-
tions, deprive people of life. State control of television, on the
other hand, which is a human rights violation under the domi-
nant conception, does not. It is probably an understatement to
say that to be physically tortured shatters the texture of one's
daily life and replaces it with a single consuming focus of sur-
viving extreme pain. State control of television does nothing of
this sort. There is state control of television in dozens of coun-
tries, including, for example, the Netherlands. Would we really
want to claim that the quality of human life in the Nether-
lands for a middle-class businessman is equivalent to being a
victim of torture?
The question here is not whether state control of television
is good or bad. The question is: is it comparable to torture? Is
it indisputably wrong in the way that torture is? Is it devas-
tating to human life in the way that torture is? Would we
really say that it is "beyond the pale of civilization" and "incon-
sistent with the most basic precepts of human decency" in the
way that we say torture is? Free access to the press may be a
good thing; it may be a very good thing. It may be necessary
for a full and happy life. It may be indirectly necessary as a
tool to expose and address such things as torture and genocide.
But is free access to the press, in itself, a prerequisite for hu-
man life or human well-being in the same way that not being
tortured or enslaved is necessary for human well-being?
Recall also that, under the dominant conception, literacy is
not a human right. Now, to what degree is a free press valu-
able (not to say essential) for the well-being of those who are
illiterate? How is it that the dominant conception does not see
any human rights violations if people are illiterate-but does
see a human rights violation if an illiterate population does not
have the right to publish and.distribute newspapers? I suggest
that our actual physical experiences in the world indicate that
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the genocide and torture-because they are physically concrete,
direct, immediate experiences-are fundamentally dissimilar to
formal political rights-which are indirect, less than essential
and in some circumstances worthless.
Conversely, there are certain economic resources which are
essential for human life, but are not included in the dominant
conception: shelter, food, medical care, clothing. Without shel-
ter and warm clothing, people who live in cold climates will
simply, literally freeze to death. Without the safety that shel-
ter provides, people who live on the streets are robbed, beaten
and raped. Without medical care, people suffer literal, physical
pain from illness and injury and may die or be crippled from
lack of treatment. Without potable water, illness and an early
death are more probable; the major cause of infant mortality in
developing countries is amoebic dysentery from untreated
drinking water.99 Is the physical experience of starving to
death from poverty different in any way from, say, being
starved to death intentionally as a form of execution? Is the
loss one feels for a child who has died for lack of a $2 medicine
so different from the loss one feels for a child killed by the
state?
Thus, if by "human rights" we refer to those things which
are "essential for human life," then the dominant conception of
human rights makes no sense: it includes things which may be
highly desirable, but are not essential to life; and it excludes
things which, in fact, are essential to human life. If by "human
rights" we are concerned with acts or situations which "shock
the conscience," which we "cannot imagine that human beings
could endure," the dominant concept includes those; but it also
includes acts or situations which are not only endurable, but
quite ordinary. If by "human rights" we mean "those principles
whose violation constitutes immediate and concrete harm,"
then the dominant conception includes some aspects of human
experience, such as enslavement or torture, which are so con-
crete that they dominate and pervade every moment of one's
conscious life. But it also includes formal and abstract rights
which people may never exercise, may never want to exercise,
may never have the means to exercise and whose absence
would have no concrete consequences for their lives.
99. See Butcher, supra note 10, at 446.
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Thus, I would argue, the dominant conception of human
rights is not only disputable, but is indeed quite odd. It is an
odd mixture of the very concrete and the purely abstract; of
what is essential to everyone and what is worthless to many;
of goods and protections which are immediately and directly
effective and those which are only contingent, indirect, or hy-
pothetical. Yet it is a concept which lays claim to being an
absolute ethical standard, with universal validity. How is it
that this came to be? In the first section, I gave a brief over-
view of the diplomatic and institutional processes in which this
conception of human rights was formulated. Now I would like
to look at the conceptual roots of the dominant conception, in
order to explain its oddness and asymmetry, as well as its
claim to absolute validity and universal applicability.
III. THE MIXED HERITAGE OF THE DOMINANT CONCEPTION: THE
JUST WAR TRADITION
The dominant conception of human rights, I would main-
tain, has an asymmetrical structure because it derives from
two very different sources: the Just War tradition, which dates
back to Augustine; and the Enlightenment notion of rights,
articulated in liberal political theory. The first essentially con-
cerns the distinction between civilization and barbarity: what
are the acts which are not only criminal or violent, but in some
sense "go beyond the pale of civilized conduct?" What are the
minimal ethical obligations owed to a person simply in virtue
of his or her humanity? The second, in contrast, concerns a
conception of the good: what is necessary for human beings to
be happy? What is necessary for a good and full life? There is
another fundamental distinction as well. The Just War tradi-
tion concerns acts and duties regarding those to whom one has
no juridical or political relation-the obligations of a warrior
toward those who are enemies of his nation, who are legally
entitled to nothing from him; they are simply, merely, human
beings. The Enlightenment tradition of rights, on the other
hand, concerns the obligations of the state to its citizens and
the limitations on the power of the state to intervene in the
decisions and acts of its citizens.
There is a long tradition of reflection by both ethical think-
ers and military theorists on the question of what constitutes a
Just War. However, the prior question is: do ethics even apply
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to war in the first place? If an individual, acting on his own
behalf, sets off a bomb in someone's home or workplace in his
own country, he would be called a criminal (or terrorist or
deviant). He would be tried and imprisoned or put to death for
violation of the law. A soldier, acting on behalf of the state,
against foreign nationals, is not bound by those laws. We do
not consider that killing the enemy in battle is criminal or
deviant; indeed, killing in these circumstances is rewarded and
praised. The soldier is not restricted by the laws governing
domestic order; but is he restricted by anything other than his
obligation to his sovereign? Stated differently: once you are
engaged in war-which is outside the lawful social order-are
there any rules of civility by which you are bound, or are you
simply outside the bounds of civilization altogether? Given that
war takes place outside the rules of law, is war a rule-gov-
erned activity at all?...
In JUST AND UNJUST WARS, 1 1 Michael Walzer describes
the cold-blooded realism of the Melian dialogue in Thucydides'
HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR;.. 2 in positions such as
Sherman's "War is hell;" and in von Clausewitz' view that war
in its pure form has no boundaries to its destruction. Walzer's
concern is to reject that "realist" view that there is no distinc-
tion between war and atrocity. For realists, he says, "war
strips away our civilized adornments and reveals our naked-
ness.""3 The realists would simply maintain: "yes, our sol-
diers committed atrocities in the course of the battle, but that's
100. See IAN CLARK, WAGING WAR 24-27 (1988) (discussing rules of military
efficiency, rules of political instrumentality and proportionality, rules of utility,
rules of positive law and rules of morality). Clearly war can be or is in fact "rule-
governed" in some of these senses. Our concern in this discussion of Just War is
the role of ethical rules. See, e.g., James F. Childress, Just-War Theories: The
Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria, in WAR, MORALITY,
AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 256, 262-63 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986) (explor-
ing the distinction between a model of war as a rule-governed activity and the
model of "war as hell."). Although, as Terry Nardin writes, "it does not follow
from the fact that in war the normal order of society is disrupted that the state
of war is one without order. The alternative to life according to one set of rules is
not necessarily life without any rules at all, but rather life according to different
rules." TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 288 (1983).
101. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 4 (1977).
102. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 400-08 (Rex
Warner trans., Penguin Books 1954).
103. WALZER, supra note 101, at 4.
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what war does to people, that's what war is like.""4
There is, however, an equally weighty tradition dating
back to Augustine which specifically asserts the relevance of
considerations of justice and articulates principles by which
Just Wars are distinguished from unjust ones. The principle of
jus ad bellum concerns the justice of the cause for which the
war is fought; jus in bello concerns the means by which the
war is conducted. In THE CITY OF GOD, °5 Augustine is using
the principle ofjus ad bellum when he suggests that the unity
of the empire has been achieved only at the cost of just and
necessary wars and that the very extent of the empire has also
produced social and civil wars. However, the wise man is will-
ing to wage Just Wars and is compelled to do so by the wrong-
doing of the other party.0 6
Jus in bello concerns two general principles: proportionali-
ty and discrimination. The principle of proportionality requires
that the harm done by the military action should be less than
the harm it seeks to prevent or rectify.' 7 The principle of dis-
crimination concerns those who will be targeted or subject to
attack in wartime and what types of weapons will be used.
This principle involves making a moral distinction in wartime
between combatants and noncombatants; wounded and non-
wounded combatants; combatants who are fighting and com-
batants who have surrendered and handed over their arms.
The principle of discrimination would prohibit blanket bombing
in civilian areas; directly targeting civilian residential areas;
104. Id.
105. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD (Marcus Dods trans., 1950).
106. See id. at 683. See also Paul Ramsey, The Just War According to St Au-
gustine, in JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR THEORY 8, 15-16 (Jean Bethke
Elshtain ed., 1992). One commentator suggests that, in the twentieth century, the
principle of jus ad bellum can principally be seen in the area of aggressive war
and proscription (or condemnation) of wars of aggression in the Hague conferences,
the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the
Nuremberg tribunal. CLARK, supra note 100, at 78. But it is certainly the case
that the notion of jus ad bellum can also be seen in the types of justifications
given for military actions since World War II. The United States, for example, has
variously invoked "making the world safe for democracy," human rights and "the
drug war" as the moral justifications for military actions.
107. For a summary of this notion, see U.S. Catholic Bishops, The Just War
and Non-Violence Positions, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION
239, 249-51 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1986) (excerpting the pastoral letter of May
1983); CLARK, supra note 100, at 35; WALZER, supra note 101, at 129-30 (discuss-
ing the difficulty and the desirability of applying the proportionality principle).
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intentionally and directly killing children, the elderly, hospital
patients, farmers and workers not involved in war production,
villagers not involved in combat, etc. The principle of discrimi-
nation would also prohibit the use of weapons which by their
nature will kill or injure civilian populations, such as nuclear,
biological, or chemical warfare.' The "laws of war" regard-
ing such matters as the treatment of prisoners and civilians
have changed as forms of war and their conventions have un-
dergone transformation. In the twentieth century, they were
codified in a series of treaties. The Fourth Hague Convention
provided that enemy soldiers who surrendered should be taken
prisoner rather than killed; captured cities could not be pil-
laged; civilian areas could not be bombed; poisoned weapons
and arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" could not
be employed. The Geneva conventions required humane treat-
ment of prisoners and protection of the sick and wounded.0 9
108. See U.S. Catholic Bishops, supra note 107, at 250-51; CLARK, supra note
100, at 35, 87-97. See also WALZER, supra note 101, at 138-59 (discussing the
doctrine of necessity); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
RESTRAINT OF WAR xxiii (1981). See also Richard Wasserstrom, The Laws of War,
in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 393 (summarizing jus in bello
principles and observing that "[flor the most part the laws of war deal with two
sorts of things: how classes of persons are to be treated in war, e.g., prisoners of
war, and what sorts of weapons and methods of attack are permissible, e.g., the
use of poison gas.").
Johnson notes that this distinction can be traced in part to the Middle
Ages. De Treuga et Pace ("Of Truces and Peace"), part of the canon law of the
13th century, "lists eight classes of persons who should have full security against
the ravages of war clerics, monks, friars, other religious, pilgrims, travelers, mer-
chants, and peasants cultivating the soil." JOHNSON, supra, at 127. There were two
other canonical limitations as well: the Truce of God prohibited combat on certain
days; and, in 1139, the Second Lateran Council banned the use of certain weapons
in combat among Christians (the crossbow, bows and arrows and siege engines).
However, Johnson notes, "[n]o mention was made of the use of these weapons in
warfare against infidels and heretics, and they remained acceptable there." Id. at
128. The second source of the distinction among classes of persons from the Mid-
dle Ages was the chivalric code, which excluded from combat both women and
peasants. The code also established conventions of courtesy, by which it was
deemed a virtue for a conquering knight to offer quarter to the vanquished knight.
Id. at 133-39.
109. See Telford Taylor, War Crimes, in NUREMBERG AND VIETNAm: AN AMERI-
CAN TRAGEDY 29-30 (1970). See also generally the Hague Conventions of 1907, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 protocols amplifying the Geneva conven-
tions. Articles 48 and 51 of the 1977 Protocols provide that:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 'at all times distin-
guish between the civilian population and combatants and between civil-
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The conventions articulated in these "rules of war" under-
score what an extraordinary situation war is; it is tempting to
use the word "abnormal," or "deviant," or Durkheim's term
"anomic." Within "normal" societal life, killing someone is mur-
der, burning down their house is arson, taking their crops is
theft and going into someone's home without permission is
burglary. All of these are crimes and those who commit them
are deemed to be deviant and anti-social in some sense, deserv-
ing of punishment, in need of rehabilitation and segregated
from the trustworthy and law-abiding sector of society. Yet in
wartime, these acts are normal and committed by one's own
soldiers, who are in fact required to do these acts and lauded
as heroes if they do them successfully. Given that all the obli-
gations one would owe to other citizens under the laws of the
nation are inapplicable-indeed, given that the instructions
from one's own nation are to kill, maim, burn and de-
stroy-what does it even mean to speak of "good" and "bad"
acts? Within a society, obligations are owed to other members
of the society, under the laws of the state; as members of this
moral community, their lives and property have moral signifi-
cance. War, however, involves interactions with those who are
not members of one's own moral community; to whom one has
no obligations under the laws of one's own state; to whom one
has no relation except a relation of enmity. Under these cir-
cumstances, then, how are we obliged to act? The principle of
discrimination explicitly creates a code of conduct and implicit-
ly creates minimum moral obligations toward those who are
not members of our moral community. Thus, it is ethical to kill
an enemy soldier; but it is unethical to massacre unarmed
women and children. It is ethical to kill a soldier in combat;
but it is unethical to bomb an infirmary for the wounded. It is
ethical to kill an enemy soldier who is armed; but it is unethi-
cal to shoot an enemy soldier in the back after he has surren-
dered and handed over his weapon. It is ethical to capture a
soldier and hold him prisoner; but it is not ethical to torture
him."0
ian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their oper-
ations only against military objectives ... The civilian population as
such, as well as individual citizens, shall not be the object of attack ...
See also Jane Olson et al., Bosnia, War Crimes and Humanitarian Intervention, 15
WH1TTIER L. REv. 445, 451 (1994).
110. I will not address here the issues of military necessity-that these acts
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In the "rules of war," the appeal is not to explicit laws
generated by a supra-national legislative body; there is no such
body, although there are treaties among equal and sovereign
state parties. The appeal (within the treaties and conventions,
as well as in the face of actual war crimes) is rather to con-
science and to an intuitive understanding of what acts, in
themselves, "shock the conscience.""' The appeal cannot be
to the legal entitlements of, and obligations to, enemy soldiers
and civilians, since they are not entitled to the protections
claimed by citizens or residents of one's own country. Thus,
rules of war constitute restrictions on the harm that may be
done to persons-not because they are citizens, with formal
legal entitlements, but simply and solely because they are
human beings. Fundamentally, they speak to the question:
what do I owe those with whom I have no social contract?
What do I owe those to whom I have no explicit duties, no
legal obligations? What do I owe those who are my ene-
mies-who have tried to kill me, or who are the kin and pro-
tectors of those who are trying to kill me? What is the mini-
mum standard of conduct that applies to a human being as
such, even a human being who is my enemy?
The principles of proportionality and discrimination imply
I am obliged to recognize, in some small degree, the humanity
of my enemy. I am obliged to recognize that his death and pain
are something of moral significance; that burning a village of
people is not akin to burning a field of dry grass; that taking a
human life, or causing human pain, is not akin to destroying
or damaging an inanimate object. Thus, I am not entitled to
indulge myself in conduct that is gratuitous and unboundaried
bloodthirstiness, even when that conduct is directed at some-
one who wishes me dead. Thus, the rules of war implicitly
draw a distinction between civilization and barbarism: the
rules of war hold that even in the absence of law, even in the
absence of contract, even in the absence of relationship, even
in circumstances of enmity-there are still some acts whose
brutality makes them indecent-inherently and directly inde-
are permitted when they are militarily necessary. I only wish to sketch out some
of the general principles that have to do with the recognition of ethical duties
owed outside of society and outside of law.
111. This is exemplified by the language used by the prosecutors at the
Nuremberg tribunals. See discussion infra Part VII.
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cent-simply because they are committed by human beings,
against human beings.
This notion does not articulate an affirmative conception of
happiness or goodness, but rather a minimum standard for
ethical conduct and for ethical entitlements. To say that one
has the right not to be tortured or executed only addresses the
minimum conditions for human life. It says nothing about the
larger possibilities for happiness. Note also that there is noth-
ing abstract about the nature of the entitlements implied by
the rules of war; death and extreme physical pain are the most
concrete human experiences there are. If the rule against tor-
ture were violated and you were the object of torture, you
would be very much aware that this violation had taken place.
It would alter your life and well-being, directly, immediately
and physically. You would require no further resources or
intermediate steps in order to experience your right. To be the
beneficiary of the rules of war does not mean that you have an
entitlement to happiness; it means only that you will be pro-
tected against brutality that is direct, physical and gratuitous.
IV. THE MIXED HERITAGE OF THE DOMINANT CONCEPTION: THE
ENLIGHTENMENT NOTION OF RIGHTS
As we have seen, the Just War tradition contains a notion
of the minimum obligation owed to someone simply by virtue
of their humanity. Furthermore, the Just War tradition con-
sists first and foremost of a code of conduct; to the extent that
there are "rights," they are inferred from the restraints on
conduct, not articulated prior to it-or for that matter, not
articulated at all by soldiers or military leaders, but only by
historians and ethicists. The customs of war, for example,
simply proscribe targeting civilians, but do not derive this
proscription from an articulated underlying theory of universal
rights (at least not prior to the twentieth century). However,
the Enlightenment notion of rights is quite different. In one
sense it is much broader, in that it entails a conception of the
good-what is involved in a complete, fulfilled human life. Yet
in a different sense it is narrower: it concerns only the political
dimension-the relation of the individual to the state and the
basis for the legitimacy of the state. And where the "rules of
war" are an empirical description of customary conduct from
which rights are only secondarily inferred, the revolutionary
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documents and political theory of the Enlightenment, which
set forth claims about rights, do not necessarily describe or
even claim to describe actual conduct. Finally, and crucially,
the Enlightenment gives us one of the fundamental notions of
modern political thought: that there are such things as rights
and that they are universal," inherent, self-evident and in-
alienable.1
3
In a sense it is presumptuous to speak at all of "an En-
lightenment conception of rights," given the tremendous diver-
sity among the thinkers of this era. The difference between the
French and German Enlightenments, for example, is quite
stark. However, my interest here is not in offering an exten-
sive discussion of the political thought of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, but in tracing the influences on human
rights theory of the mid and late twentieth century, by indicat-
ing some of the elements we have inherited and appropriated.
I will do this by quickly reviewing some of the central themes
which emerge again and again in Enlightenment political
thought, looking specifically at social contract theory and the
proclamations of rights in the French and American revolu-
tions. The social contract theorists assert an original condition
(whether historical or mythical) in which individuals have
natural rights. The revolutionary proclamations assert the
present existence and nature of rights.
A. The Social Contract Theorists
Hobbes' political writings set out the rational grounds for
obedience to authority; while maintaining that those grounds
consisted in the natural rights of individuals, prior to and
112. As has been pointed out on many occasions, the "universe" for the En-
lightenment thinkers was in fact limited to white males of European descent. See,
e.g., CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 221 (1988) (observing that "[t]hrough
the mirror of the original contract, citizens can see themselves as members of a
society constituted by free relations. The political fiction reflects our political selves
back to us-but who are" we'? Only men-who can create political life-can take
part in the original pact."); see also DIANA H. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEO-
RY 71-132 (1988) (discussing Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau). For a discussion of the
implicit and explicit racism in the revolutionary thought of the Enlightenment, see
RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 1-15 (1979). My interest here lies in addressing the notion of universal
rights as such.
113. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 31, 40 n.34 (1995-96).
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outside of the existence of the state. The state of nature was
characterized by a fundamental equality: "Nature hath made
men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind .... For as
to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confeder-
acy with others, that are in the same danger with
himselfe.""
4
The result of this equality is an ongoing state of war,
"where every man is Enemy to every man.""' In this state,
there is "continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the
life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.""6 The
"right of nature,""7 consists in "the Liberty each man hath,
to use his own power ... for the preservation of his own Na-
ture; that is to say, of his own Life" and to anything he con-
ceives to be useful toward that end."' Hobbes defines liberty
as the "absence of externall Impediments" which may "take
away part of a mans power to do what he would.""' Hobbes
distinguishes "right" from "law," concluding that right consists
in liberty to do or forebear from doing, while law determines
and binds. Law, for Hobbes, is obligation, while right is liber-
ty."'20 It follows, he says, that because everyone may make
use of anything which is of use to him in preserving his life
against his enemies, in such a condition, "every man has a
Right to every thing."'2'
Consequently, the sovereign does not rule by divine right
or a right of tradition; rather, sovereign power is conferred by
consent of individuals living in the warlike state of nature.
Hobbes writes that "[a] Common-wealth is said to be Institut-
ed, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every
one, with every one" and when they agree "to submit to some
Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be pro-
tected by him against all others."' Thus, sovereignty is con-
ferred by individuals; and it is conferred by individuals who
114. THOmiAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 183 (Penguin Books, 1968) (1651).
115. Id. at 186.
116. Id.
117. Hobbes is here translating jus Naturale, or natural law. Id. at 189.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 190.
122. Id. at 228.
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have a "right to everything."
Similarly, Locke, in replying to Filmer's defense of rule by
divine right, rejects the position that "[m]en are not born free,
and therefore could never have the liberty to choose either
Governors, or Forms of Government.""2 In his Second Trea-
tise of Government, Locke maintains that "[t]o understand
Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must
consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a
State of Perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of
their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit ....
Locke maintains that "[tIhe State of Nature has a Law of Na-
ture to govern it," which is reason; and that reason "teaches all
Mankind... that.., no one ought to harm another in his
Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions."" Reason, as law of na-
ture, likewise indicates that everyone is bound to preserve
himself and to preserve the rest of mankind as well. 26 Since
the "Fundamental Law of Nature" dictates that man should be
preserved, he has a right to destroy anyone who threatens him
with destruction or enslavement. 27 The "Natural Liberty of
Man is to be free from any Superior Power on Earth," Locke
says, "but to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule."128
Thus, legislative power over man within the commonwealth
can be established only by consent. 29
Unlike Hobbes, who spoke of equality in the state of na-
ture as actual physical and mental equality, Locke asserts an
"equal right" in the face of actual inequality:
Though I have said above, Chap. II, That all Men by Nature
are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of
Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency:
Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the
Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or
Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Na-
ture, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and
yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in,
123. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 143 (Peter Laslett ed., Stu-
dent ed. 1988) (1690).
124. Id. at 269.
125. Id. at 271.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 278-79.
128. Id. at 283.
129. See id.
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in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another,
which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the
Business in hand, being that equal Right that every Man
hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the
Will or Authority of any other Man."'
Also unlike Hobbes, Locke distinguishes liberty from free-
dom. Liberty is freedom from restraint; but freedom is not the
liberty for each person to do as he wishes, "[flor who could be
free, when every other Man's Humour might domineer over
him?""' Freedom is rather the "Liberty to dispose, and order,
as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole
Property, with the Allowance of those Laws under which he
is .. . .""' With language that seems to anticipate Kant,
Locke says that "[t]he Freedom then of Man and Liberty of
acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having
Reason, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to
govern himself by... .""3 Thus, he says, "we are born Free,
as we are born Rational; not that we have actually the Exer-
cise of either: Age that brings one [the age of majority], brings
with it the other too."" 4
All of these discussions are from the chapters on the state
of nature, the state of war, slavery, property and paternal
power. Yet, in a rather different vein, in the chapter entitled
Of the Beginning of Political Societies, Locke says that "[m]en
being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and indepen-
dent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the
Political Power of another, without his own Consent.""'
This contrasts markedly with Locke's earlier statements:
that freedom is not the freedom for each to do as he wishes,
but rather the freedom to act on one's will to the extent al-
lowed by law; that there are inequalities of age, virtue, birth
and so on; that one is dependent and subordinate to one's par-
ents at birth; and that in the state of nature one has obliga-
tions both to and from mankind as a whole. Thus, it is as a
citizen-that is, as an individual consenting to the formation of
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id. at 306.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id. at 308.
135. Id. at 330.
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government-that Locke describes man as "by Nature, all free,
equal, and independent." Yet these qualities would not seem to
apply to the individual in his family relations, his social rela-
tions, or his pursuit of his desires and interests.
Rousseau reiterates the conception of a state of nature as
the origin of rights and consent as the basis for legitimate
sovereignty. "Man is born free, and everywhere is in chains,"
he writes in the beginning of ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 38
"Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow man,"
Rousseau writes, "and since force does not give rise to any
right, conventions therefore remain the basis of all legitimate
authority among men."137
The transition from the state of nature to the civil state
takes place when each individual alienates his rights to the
whole community, which is expressed in the general will. 3 '
For Rousseau, the state of nature was characterized by sim-
plicity and an innocent goodness. Whereas individuals in civil
society are competitive, deceitful and greedy, "savage man" has
simple needs and is easily satisfied. "The only goods he knows
in the universe," writes Rousseau, "are nourishment, a woman,
and rest; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger."'39 In
the state of nature, human beings are agile, robust and satis-
fied--I see [the savage man] satisfying his hunger under an
oak tree, quenching his thirst at the first stream, finding his
bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied his meal; and
thus his needs are satisfied."4 ° The state of nature is charac-
terized by savage man's "natural liberty and an unlimited right
to everything that tempts him and that he can acquire." 4'
"Every man by nature has a right," Rousseau writes, "to every-
thing he needs."'
In civil society, according to Rousseau, the individual
alienates his rights to the community as a whole: "Each of us
places his person and all his power in common under the su-
136. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17 (Donald A. Cress
trans. & ed., 1983) (1762).-
137. Id. at 20.
138. See id. at 26-27.
139. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF
INEQUALITY AMONG MEN 126 (Donald A. Cress trans. & ed., 1983) (1755).
140. Id. at 120.
141. ROUSSEAU, supra note 136, at 27.
142. Id. at 27.
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preme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each
member as an indivisible apart of the whole."" Sovereignty
is then "merely the exercise of the general will," and the sover-
eign is the "collective being" that the general will
represents.'" The social contract, according to Rousseau, in-
volves a transformation from inequality to equality. Rousseau
writes that "the fundamental compact.., substitutes a moral
and legitimate equality [for] whatever physical inequality na-
ture may have imposed upon men... however[] unequal in
force or intelligence they may be, men all become equal by
convention and by right."45
Thus, our status as equal or unequal is characterized by
duality. We continue to be unequal in fact-in strength or
intelligence-while being equal in some other sense, as "moral"
equals in the face of the law. According to Rousseau, in the
passage from the state of nature to civil society, the individual
cedes all of his rights to the community as a whole.'46 The
community as a whole is both the source of its own law and
bound by that law. The sovereign consists of the community
itself: "the social compact gives the body politic an absolute
power over all its members, and it is the same power
which... is directed by the general will and bears the name
sovereignty." "
Since the citizen participates in the general will by virtue
of his membership in the body politic, the citizen is-in some
sense-the sovereign. However, the exercise of sovereign power
concerns only public (civil) matters. While the sovereign power
is "absolute, wholly sacred and inviolable," it does not dictate
the private use and disposition of property, because when the
matter becomes a private one, the sovereign's power is no lon-
ger competent.
Within the social contract tradition, the claim that indi-
viduals possess rights prior to and apart from the state is the
basis for determining both the legitimacy and the limitations of
the acts of the state. At the same time, the state is the only
143. Id. at 24.
144. Id. at 29.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 24.
147. Id. at 32.
148. Id. at 34.
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body which enforces and protects one's rights. For the social
contract theorists, the individual in the state of nature had
unlimited "rights." But this did not mean that he or she would
be able to exercise or act on those rights. In the state of na-
ture, everyone had the same natural rights, which were unlim-
ited and mutually exclusive. But, of course, "having" natural
rights to everything did not mean that an individual actually
had everything, or even that an individual had anything at all,
since anyone else who was able to take or monopolize resourc-
es might well have done exactly that.
Thus, in the social contract tradition, to have rights in the
state of nature-for example, to have the right to kill for
food-clearly did not mean that an individual would in fact
have anything; a given individual might kill for food, or might
himself be killed by someone or something stronger. On the
other hand, to have rights after the formation of society means
only that there are limits on the acts of the sovereign and the
individual is entitled to take certain actions against the sover-
eign if these limits are violated.
The French and American revolutions at the end of the
eighteenth century, I will argue, both invoked the concept of
rights, in roughly the same sense as this notion was formulat-
ed by the social contract theorists: first, rights inhere in indi-
viduals and precede the formation of the state. They are the
basis for the legitimacy of the state-not claims whose legiti-
macy is granted by the state. Second, the original rights held
by individuals pertain to their self-interest-their sustenance,
their self-preservation, their freedom to pursue their own ends
and desires. This freedom is a negative freedom, that is, free-
dom from prohibitions. Finally, these rights speak to the rela-
tion between the individual and the state: the original rights
are the basis on which the individual consents to be ruled; and
they are the justification for rebellion in the event of tyranny
by the sovereign.
This view of rights can also be seen in the documents
which were promulgated as the justifications for the American
and French revolutions. The American Declaration of Indepen-
dence begins by proclaiming the people's dissolution of the
existing political bands, "to assume among the powers of the
earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of
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Nature and of Nature's God entitle them."1'4 According to the
Declaration of Independence, it is a "self-evident" truth that
"all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights," which include "Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."'50 These rights are
prior to government and legitimate government is a convention
based upon consent: "to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed." 5' The people retain the right to
dissolve a government: 'That whenever any Form of Govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it."'52
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
of 1789... (Declaration of the Rights of Man or French Decla-
ration) echoes the language of Rousseau, the American Decla-
ration of Independence and the social contract theorists. It
holds that "ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt of the rights of
man, are the sole causes of the public miseries and of the cor-
ruption of governments," and then sets forth the "natural,
inalienable, and sacred rights of man," in order that "the acts
of the legislative power and those of the executive power may
be each moment compared with the aim of every political insti-
149. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of June 12, 1776, is, interestingly,
both more explicit and more concrete. It states:
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity;, namely,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and pos-
sessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
2. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the Peo-
ple; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times
amenable to them.
3. That Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; . . . and
that, whenever any Government shall be found inadequate or contrary to
these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalien-
able, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it ....
VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS arts. 1-3, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION 6 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
153. See DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN [hereinafter DECLA-
RATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN], reprinted in, THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER DOC-
UIMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907 15 (2d ed. 1908).
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tution," which is the preservation of the rights of man.' The
Declaration of the Rights of Man then states that, accordingly:
[Tihe National Assembly recognizes and declares ... the
following rights of man and citizen.
1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.
Social distinctions can be based only upon public utility.
2. The aim of every political association is the preserva-
tion of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.
These rights are liberty, property, security, and resis-
tance to oppression.
4. Liberty consists in the power to do anything that does
not injure others; accordingly, the exercise of the natu-
ral rights of each man has no limits except those that
secure to the other members of society the enjoyment of
these same rights. These limits can be determined only
by law.
6. Law is the expression of the general will; .... It
must be the same for all, whether it protects or punish-
es. All citizens [are] equal in its eyes ....
11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one
of the most precious of the rights of man; every citizen
then can speak, write, and print, subject to responsibili-
ty for the abuse of this freedom in the cases determined
by law.
17. Property being a sacred and inviolable right, no one
can be deprived of it, unless a legally established public
necessity evidently demands it, under the condition of a
154. Id. preamble.
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just and prior indemnity.155
These proclamations of rights are thoroughly familiar to
us. Yet their very familiarity obscures something quite obvious:
the literal meaning of the words. This is the basis of the em-
piricist critique of rights and it is worth reiterating the argu-
ments of two of the leading empiricist critics of rights from the
Enlightenment, Bentham and Hume, who assert that the dec-
larations of rights are quite simply counterfactual.
B. The Empiricist Critique
In his essay, On the Original Contract, first published in
1748, Hume summarizes the basic claims of the social contract
theorists:
When we consider how nearly equal all men. are in their
bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties,
till cultivated by education, we must necessarily allow, that
nothing but their own consent could, at first, associate them
together, and subject them to any authority. The people, if we
trace government to its first origin in the woods and deserts,
are the source of all power and jurisdiction .... Nothing but
their own consent, and their sense of the advantages result-
ing from peace and order, could have had that influence.156
But, says Hume, look around us-there is no sign that
there was, or is, consent by subjects or recognition by those
who hold power that their legitimacy rests upon such consent.
But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they
would meet with nothing that, in the least, corresponds to
their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical a
system. On the contrary, we find every where princes who
claim their subjects as their property and assert their inde-
pendent right of sovereignty, from conquest of succession. We
find also every where subjects who acknowledge this right in
their prince and suppose themselves born under obligations
of obedience to a certain sovereign .... Obedience or subjec-
tion becomes so familiar, that most men never make any
inquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the gravi-
155. Id. arts. 1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 17.
156. David Hume, On the Original Contract, in SOcIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY
LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 209, 211-12 (Ernest Barker ed., 1947).
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ty, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature.5 7
Hume continues, observing that "[ailmost all the govern-
ments which exist at present, or of which there remains any
record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpa-
tion or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair con-
sent or voluntary subjection of the people."15
Hume asked where the social contract could be found in
the world's shifting political fortunes:
The face of the earth is- continually changing, by the increase
of small kingdoms into great empires, by the dissolution of
great empires into smaller kingdoms, by the planting of colo-
nies, by the migration of tribes. Is there anything discover-
able in all these events but force and violence? Where is the
mutual agreement or voluntary association so much talked
ofR?
159
Hume's point is quite obvious: in the social and political
world around us, there is no sign of either the social contract
or the natural rights on which it rests. If we look around us, or
look at history, we see only the opposite: government based
upon force or tradition and obedience based upon fear or habit.
Bentham's criticism concerns more the logical and linguis-
tic issues: when we claim that we "have" a "right," what exact-
ly is the referent? What is it exactly that we "have?" It is in
this context that Bentham remarks: "Natural rights [are] sim-
ple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts."'
The tone may be contemptuous, but his objection is a seri-
ous one. In Anarchical Fallacies, Bentham dissects the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man line by line and word by word.
Bentham states that "[t]he criticism is verbal:-true, but what
else can it be? Words-words without a meaning, or with a
meaning too flatly false to be maintained by anybody, are the
stuff it is made of. Look to the letter, you find nonsense-look
157. Id. at 213-14.
158. Id. at 215-16.
159. Id. at 216.
160. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Dec-
laration of Rights Issued During the French Revolution, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS:
BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed.,
1987).
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beyond the letter, you find nothing." 16 1
This is a serious and precise objection. On the one hand,
the claims of the document, if taken literally, are flatly false.
On the other, if one asserts that the words do not literally
refer to reality-then to what do they refer? The answer can
only be that they refer to a fiction, a fantasy, some sort of
wishful thinking.
Bentham begins with the claims of freedom and equality.
Article I of the Declaration of the Rights of Man provides that
"Men (all men) are born and remain free, and equal in respect
of rights."6 ' Bentham responds:
All men are born free? All, men remain free? No, not a single
man: not a single man that ever was, or is, or will be. All
men, on the contrary, are born in subjection, and the most
absolute subjection-the subjection of a helpless child to the
parents on whom he depends every moment for his exis-
tence."
As Bentham elaborates:
All men are born equal in rights. The rights of the heir of the
most indigent family equal to the rights of the heir of the
most wealthy? In what case is this true? ... The madman
has as good a right to confine anybody else, as anybody else
has to confine him. The idiot has as much right to govern
everybody, as anybody can have to govern him. The physician
and the nurse, when called in by the next friend of a sick
man seized with a delirium, have no more right to prevent
him throwing himself out of the window, than he has to
throw them out of it. All this is plainly and incontestably
included in this article of the Declaration of Rights: in the
very words of it, and in the meaning-if it has any mean-
ing.1
6 4
Bentham's intention is partly to point out that it is just
factually incorrect to say that human beings are free and
equal, and partly to suggest that we would not even want this
161. Id. at 49.
162. Id. (paraphrasing DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 153,
art. 1).
163. Bentham, supra note 160, at 49.
164. Id. at 50-51.
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state of affairs to actually take place. We obviously don't want
both the qualified and the unqualified to have equal rights to
perform surgery;... and if we say that the former may per-
form surgery and the latter may not, then we have committed
ourselves both to inequality and to restrictions on freedom. So
what does it mean-in the face of actual inequality and restric-
tions on freedom, to insist on the "existence" of rights? In the
end, Bentham argues, it makes no sense to speak of
rights-literally, the word "right" has no referent. As much as
we may wish for some natural entitlement to freedom or equal-
ity, prior to and independent of the acts of particular govern-
ments, there is no such thing; and insisting on its existence
will not in fact bring it into existence.
In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the
want of rights, a reason exists for wishing there were such
things as rights. But reasons for wishing there were such
things as rights, are not rights;--a reason for wishing that a
certain right were established, is not that right-want is not
supply-hunger is not bread.1"
Bentham's and Hume's empiricist criticisms make starkly
clear that the assertions about the existence and origin of
rights, taken at face value, are not only counterfactual, but
patently ridiculous. What does it mean to say that rights are
"inherent?" This claim seems to suggest that they are natural
and not artifacts; that they are discovered rather than invent-
ed. If they are inherent, why were they not known for thou-
sands of years after the beginning of human society? When
they are identified as "inherent" in a particular document, at a
particular historical moment, are they not in fact being be-
stowed by virtue of their pronouncement? Which is to say: they
are not inherent at all; they are invented, claimed, bestowed.
In what sense are these rights self-evident? Our experi-
ence in fact suggests the opposite-that if we look around us at
human lives and human society, we in fact see very little evi-
dence that all persons are happy, or are free, or are fraternal,
or are prosperous. What is self-evident seems to be the oppo-
165. While the Declaration of the Rights of Man does say that social distinc-
tions should be based on "common utility," Bentham points out that this does not
resolve the problem, but only creates a contradiction.
166. Id. at 53.
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site: that more often than not, human beings suffer; more often
than not, that they are restricted and oppressed in innumera-
ble ways; more often than not, they live their lives in hunger
and poverty. And if these are the circumstances in which hu-
man beings generally live, then in what sense are rights to
property, fraternity, liberty and equality "inalienable?" Of
course these rights are "alienable'--it is possible to have a
human life without them. In fact, most of us do.
Bentham and Hume are quite right: what is striking is
how implausible the claims about rights are. The notion of
rights is perhaps so familiar to us that the language and
claims of rights seem obvious and plausible. But they are not.
"Man is born free," writes Rousseau,' but in fact, human
beings are born helpless and dependent. "[Elvery man has a
Right to every thing," writes Hobbes of the state of nature,68
because everyone may make use of anything that will contrib-
ute to his self-preservation. But in fact, in a state of war of all
against all, there is no "right" at all, only power: those who are
stronger will take and use whatever they choose. The French
and American Declarations of Rights would seem to be even
more absurd. It is not self-evident that people are equal. What
is evident is the opposite: that at all times in history and in all
sectors of society, there are great inequalities in status, in
power, in abilities, in property and in entitlements.
Thus, we seem to have a paradox on our hands. The rights
which are held to be natural are, in fact, quite unnatural. The
rights which are held to be inalienable are not only "alienable,"
but in fact quite rare. The rights which are held to be self-
evident are in fact quite inconsistent with all of the evidence.
What, then, is a "right" exactly? What can we coherently
argue that we actually "have" which is inherent, inalienable
and self-evident? I suggest that it is at most either a moral
imperative or a conception of the good: The claim that all peo-
ple ought to be equal and all people ought to be free; or that it
would be good if everyone were equal and it would be good if
everyone were free. This means, however, that we are not
talking about a "right" anymore, but a statement of universal
desire-a description of the human ideal, not something which
167. ROUSSEAU, supra note 136, at 17.
168. HOBBES, supra note 114, at 190.
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must in fact happen, or has ever happened, or will ever hap-
pen. At most, what is "inherent" or "self-evident" is a universal
conception of the good.
V. TWO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF RIGHTS
We saw that the notion of rights that emerged in the polit-
ical thought of the Enlightenment has four features.
First, rights are abstract. One can have a right to proper-
ty, but at the same time have no actual property. The fact that
one has no property presents no conflict or disproof of the exis-
tence of the right to property, since the right is neither an offer
nor a promise of property.
Second, rights are political. These rights concern the rela-
tion of the individual to the state. The right to liberty means
only that the state will not deprive an individual of liberty
except under certain circumstances (although individuals may
deprive other individuals of liberty in many circumstances, for
example, by owning land and excluding others from its use).
Third, rights are very broadly conceived. The rights in the
state of nature constitute an entitlement literally to every-
thing; the rights under the social contract assert an entitle-
ment to everything not prohibited by the state; and in the
revolutionary proclamations, rights are stated as unconditional
entitlements to such things as "freedom" and "equality."
Fourth, the notion of rights involves claims which are
counterfactual. They have the curious feature of purporting to
be natural, inalienable and eternal, even though, as a descrip-
tion of ordinary reality, they are quite false.
Fifth, rights are "reified" claims of entitlement. The notion
of reification is used where a relationship, or process, or idea
comes to be thought of as a thing or substance. Thus, the claim
that one ought to be free is "reified" when it is said that one
has a "right" which is implicitly treated as a thing insofar as it
is seen as something which can be possessed.
Where the Enlightenment thinkers proclaimed the exis-
tence of rights, on the grounds that rights are inherent or
natural, contemporary philosophers offer a more sophisticated
structure for the justification of rights as ethical claims. One of
the standard assumptions in this literature is that a right is
some form of justified claim' 69-- but also that a "right" is
169. For example, Joseph Raz writes, -'x has a right' means that, other things
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something that is held, or enjoyed, or possessed, even when
material reality is to the contrary. Consequently, I will argue,
the contemporary philosophical discussion of the nature and
justification of human rights reiterates the fundamental para-
dox of the Enlightenment notion of rights without resolving it.
In this section, I will briefly review two of the attempts to
address this issue in the contemporary philosophical literature.
Maurice Cranston maintains that a human right is a type
of moral right. "[We justify the moral rights of an individual,"
he writes, "by arguing that those rights have been earned or
that they have been acquired by gift, bequest, sale or some
other contractual undertaking." ° Human rights, while they
"clearly belong to the category of moral rights," cannot be justi-
fied in this fashion, since they are not dependent upon a par-
ticular act of creation or contract. Cranston contends that
these rights "belong to a man simply because he is a man.""
Gewirth makes the same point: "Human rights are rights or
entitlements that belong to every person; thus, they are uni-
versal moral rights." 2 Gewirth maintains that "[alt bottom,
the idea of human rights is a moral one. It becomes a legal and
political idea only because of its supreme moral impor-
tance.""7
being equal, an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." See Joseph Raz, Right-Based
Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182, 183 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). In A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, John Rawls says that "[a] conception of right is a set of prin-
ciples, general in form and universal in application, that is to be publicly recog-
nized as a final court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral per-
sons." JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 135 (1971). Henry Shue says that "[a]
moral right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) that the
actual enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against standard
threats." HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 13 (2d ed. 1996). Shue continues to contend that "[a] right provides the
rational basis for a justified demand. If a person has a particular right, the de-
mand that the enjoyment of the substance of the right be socially guaranteed is
justified by good reasons and the guarantees ought, therefore, to be provided." Id.
Sarat and Kearns state that "rights are assumed to be entitlements of persons
whose status as persons is fixed and from which rights are said to issue." Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Introduction, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 1
(Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
170. CRANSTON, supra note 87, at 22.
171. Id. at 24.
172. ALAN GEWmiRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICA-
TIONS 42 (1982).
173. Id. at ix.
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And what is a human right, exactly? In The Epistemology
of Human Rights, Gewirth addresses the question of the "exis-
tence" of rights. "Human rights are rights which all persons
equally have simply insofar as they are human. But are there
any such rights? How, if at all, do we know that there
are?" 4 It is with this question of knowledge and the related
question of existence that I want to deal in this paper.
Gewirth argues that human rights are "personally orient-
ed, normatively necessary, moral requirements."'75 Human
rights are "personally oriented" in that they are "requirements
that are owed to distinct Subjects or individuals for the good of
those individuals.""6 Human rights are "normatively nec-
essary" in that compliance with them is morally mandatory,
rather than supererogatory. Human rights are "moral require-
ments" in that they are: (1) necessary needs; (2) justified
entitlements; and (3) claims or demands addressed to other
persons. 7 Thus, the justifying basis of human rights is "a
normative moral principle that serves to prove or establish
that every human morally ought, as a matter of normative
necessity, to have the necessary goods as something to which
he is personally entitled, which he can claim from others as his
due.'7
Gewirth observes that:
In the phrase, "there are human rights", "there are" is ambig-
uous as between positive and normative meanings. In the
sense of "existence" that is relevant here, the existence of
human rights is independent of whether they are guaranteed
or enforced by legal codes or are socially recognized."9
Thus, Gewirth resolves the ambiguity by essentially adopt-
ing the position that a human right is a type of "ought," and is
binding as an "ought" insofar as a rational moral argument can
be constructed in its support.80 Human rights, then, share
the features of all moral claims, morality being "a set of cate-
174. Alan Gewirth, The Epistemology of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 1
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1984).
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id. at 2-3.
177. See id. at 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3.
180. See id.
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gorically obligatory requirements for action."'8 '1 They also
share the general features of rights: "a person's rights are
what belong to him as his due, what he is entitled to, hence
what he can rightly demand of others."8 2 Gewirth justifies
this position in terms of the nature of human action and the
attribute of dignity: "By virtue of the voluntariness of his ac-
tions, the agent has a kind of autonomy or freedom... [the
agent] can and does make his own decisions on the basis of his
own reflective understanding... By virtue of these character-
istics of his action, the agent has worth or dignity."18 3 Conse-
quently, he says "all humans are held to have rights to the
necessary conditions of their action." "'
Danto's criticism of Gewirth's claim could have been writ-
ten by Bentham. He describes a situation in which he was on a
committee charged with developing a disciplinary procedure for
the university:
We all wondered... what right we had to do what was
asked of us, and a good bit of time went into expressing our
insecurities. Finally, a man from the law-school said, with
the tried patience of someone required to explain what should
be as plain as day... : "This is the way it is with rights. You
want 'em, so you say you got 'em, and if nobody says you
don't then you do." In the end he was right. We worked a
code out which nobody liked, but in debating it the communi-
ty acknowledged the rights. Jefferson did not say that it was
self-evident that there were human rights and which they
were: he said we hold this ... self-evident .... This is the
way it is with rights. We declare we have them, and see if
they are recognized. After that it is a matter of lobbying or
something more extreme .... "
It is not clear that Gewirth is in a position to offer a satis-
factory response to Danto's (or Bentham's) position. If his in-
tention was to show that rights "exist," he has fundamentally
shown only that there are certain justifications for saying that
181. GEWIRTH, supra note 172, at 45.
182. Id. at 48.
183. Id. at 22-23.
184. Id. at 24.
185. Arthur C. Dante, Comment on Gewirth. Constructing an Epistemology of
Human Rights: A Pseudo Problem?, in HUnfAN RIGHTS 25, 30 (Ellen Frankel Paul
et al. eds., 1984).
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people ought to act in a certain way. His argument in the end
is an ethical rather than ontological one. Yet he wants to say
that when we speak of how people ought to act, that this some-
how translates into a thing that we possess. Gewirth claims
that he rejects the reification of rights. Gewirth contends that
"[allthough Thomas Jefferson wrote that all humans 'are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,' it is
not the case that humans are born having rights in the sense
in which they are born having legs."8 ' Yet the language of
reification continues to appear: rights are things that we
"have;" 87 they are "normative property;"" "a person's
rights are what belong to him as his due."'89
Unlike Gewirth, Dworkin explicitly frames rights as in
terms of their political context: "Individual rights are political
trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for
some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for
denying them what they wish. ...""' Thus, "rights" are the
claims invoked by individuals against the collective or commu-
nity interests. "If someone has a right to something, then it is
wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it
would be in the general interest to do so."'9 ' In TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Dworkin explores the issue of whether
"citizens have some moral rights against their Govern-
ment."'92 The particular political rights for which Dworkin
argues are derived, in turn, 'Trom the abstract right to concern
and respect taken to be fundamental and axiomatic."'93
Dworkin notes that he presumes "that we all accept the follow-
ing postulates of political morality."94 He further states:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern,
that is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and
frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who
are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions
of how their lives should be lived. Government must not only
186. Gewirth, supra note 174, at 3.
187. GEWIRTH, supra note 172, at 19-20.
188. Id. at 10.
189. Id. at 48.
190. RONALD DWORKIN, TAXING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).
191. Id. at 269.
192. Id. at 184.
193. Id. at xv.
194. Id. at 272.
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treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern
and respect. 5
Rejecting the positivist view, Dworkin argues for a theory
of law that holds that political rights pre-exist legal rights,
since they are to be invoked against the state. Yet these politi-
cal rights are at the same time moral rights and they are justi-
fied in terms of the moral personality of the individual. Thus,
Dworkin's position is ultimately that a right is a proposition
about how government ought to act, as Gewirth's is fundamen-
tally a position about how a person ought to act in the face of
certain claims. Both fundamentally offer theories about which
imperatives can be best justified. They are theories of how
individuals and governments ought to act, based upon the
assertions that individuals "have" dignity, or "are" equal. But
no matter how much more sophisticated these contemporary
theories of justified claims are than the earlier claims of the
Enlightenment thinkers and political actors, they are no less
problematic. Thus, the paradox remains: if we claim that a
right is something we "have," then either the claim is often
patently false, or what we "have" is just an empty abstraction.
On the other hand, if a right is a statement of aspirations, of a
goal toward which we are striving, then many of the descrip-
tions of rights-that they are inalienable, universal and so
on-simply make no sense.
Dworkin and Gewirth reject positivist arguments that
rights are only those claims which are recognized and enforced
and they offer arguments and a vision as to how human beings
and governments ought to act. Yet, the vision is not purely
normative; it is ontological as well. The arguments are not
simply that "it would be good if governments treated individu-
als with equal respect and concern," but rather that individu-
als "have the right" to be treated with equal respect and con-
cern; and that is why governments should do so. The thing
that we have when we "have" a right would therefore be some-
thing more abstract than the (empirically observable) enforce-
ment actions of the state; and more solid (indeed, reified) than
an argument about how people and states should act. Gewirth
and Dworkin, along with others, thus inherit the
195. Id.
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Enlightenment's paradoxical project of devising a moral claim
with an actual "existence."
VI. RESOLVING THE PARADOX: MARX AND THE METAPHYSICS OF
RIGHTS
So let us re-ask Bentham's question of two hundred years
ago: what is it you actually have when you have a right? What
is it you actually are, when you are free or equal, in the sense
used in proclamations of rights?
The problem is this: there are these claims-that we
"have" something or that we "are" something-and that "some-
thing" is absolute, binding and eternal. Yet this eternally exist-
ing state is often or even always simply contrary to fact. "All
men are free"-but of course they are not. Some are impris-
oned, some are incapacitated. "All men are equal," yet some
are stronger, richer, more powerful than others. "All persons
have dignity," yet many are humiliated in their homes, in their
workplaces, by the state, or in public discourse.
If claims about rights were simply and directly
aspirational or normative statements--"All persons should be
free and equal"--there would be no paradox. There might well
be a very different sort of problem: we would disagree over
what we should aspire to, or how people should act. But that is
not how assertions about rights are framed. They are present-
ed not as normative or aspirational, but as statements about
our current (not to say eternal) condition; or as possessions we
now (and since the beginning of time) have (and have had).
Under positive law theories, a "right" is just a description
of how the state will act under certain circumstances.196 In
this view, "I have a right not to be assaulted" means that if I
am assaulted, I can- call the police and they will arrest the
assailant, the district attorney will prosecute the assailant and
so on. Legal positivism maintains that there is no such thing
as a "right" independent of the institutional processes of the
196. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (1961) (summarizing some of
the basic ideas of the legal positivists). Hart asked what the underlying "concern
of the great battle-cries of legal positivism" was, referring to Austin's "'[t]he exis-
tence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another;' Gray's '[tihe law of a
State is not an ideal but something which actually exists ...it is not that which
ought to be, but that which is;' and Kelson's '[legal norms may have any kind of
content.'" Id.
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state which define and explicate the rights that it will enforce.
Under legal positivism, if we ask "what rights exist other than
those which the state recognizes and enforces," the answer is
"none." If the state changes its policy and its conduct, the right
simply disappears. In this view, an individual has no
entitlements prior to or outside of the acts of government. The
"right" to inherit property or to collect a debt is a right created
by the state, enforceable only on the terms dictated by the
state and by means of procedures established by the state.
Alternatively, natural law asserts that there is some high-
er law which positive law aspires to, or approaches. 9 ' In this
view, natural law is where justice resides; it operates as a
regulative ideal, a standard toward which actual, particular
laws aspire. If a "right" is something given by natural law,
then we would speak of that toward which we strive-freedom,
equality-but do not have. Natural law is the measure we use
to gauge the justness of actual laws. But natural law is not
concrete or enforceable in the way that the right to inherit is;
natural law by definition transcends the state, which is the
source of actual and particular laws, their articulation and
their enforcement.
However, the thinkers of the Enlightenment, as well as
contemporary philosophers of rights, maintain both that
"rights" are that toward which we aspire; and that rights are
nevertheless something we have, or describe what it is that we
are.' The Enlightenment conception of rights does not fit
cleanly within the framework of either natural law or positive
law. It holds that, in contradistinction to positive legal
entitlements, there exist legal rights inherent in the individu-
al, prior to and outside of the state and society. Indeed, the
relation between state and individual is a precise inversion of
the one given in positive law: it is no longer the individual who
looks to the state to determine his entitlements, but the state
which looks to the contract among individuals to justify its
very existence. And, in contrast to natural law, the Enlighten-
197. Hart notes that the notion of natural law includes the idea that "there
are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with
which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid." Id. at 182.
198. The problem is made explicit in the grammar of statements about rights.
They are statements made in the present tense, indicative mood; but which are in
fact counterfactual imperatives in the subjunctive mood.
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ment conception of rights very much anticipates enforcement
in concrete ways: the Enlightenment rights were presented as
things that we have, or the condition in which we are, and
these possessions or factual states of affairs were presented as
the grounds for revolutions and political institutions.
Thus, "rights" in the Enlightenment view had a curious
ontological status from the beginning: they are neither positive
laws, articulated by actual, particular governments; nor are
they natural laws which guide positive law, but which in them-
selves transcend both explication and enforcement. Rather, the
Enlightenment view holds that rights are in a sense justified
by their other-worldly origin, though they equally lay claim to
being present and active in this world. Marx argues that, for
this reason, the Enlightenment conception of a right is thus, in
a sense, simultaneously sacred and profane.
In his essay, On the Jewish Question, Karl Marx criticizes
Bruno Bauer for addressing the question of political emancipa-
tion without examining the prior matter of human emancipa-
tion.'99 Marx explicitly rejects the entire Enlightenment
treatment of rights for the same reason. This applies to the
rights of equality, liberty, security and property from the Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man, as well as the similar rights
articulated in the American Declaration of Independence. Marx
observes that these documents see the individual as a "self-
sufficient monad," whose rights concern the pursuit of egoistic
self-interest, with security serving as the guarantee of that
egoism. 20
If Marx's only response to the Enlightenment conception of
rights was that such rights are bourgeois and self-serving, then
his criticism would indeed be shallow and without much philo-
sophical value. But, I would argue, the heart of his critique is
not that "people should care about others and not be selfish
and individualistic," or some comparable platitude. His cri-
tique, as I understand it, is that the notion of rights involves
an idealist metaphysics;2 ' that this idealism serves to not
199. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS
211-16 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., 1975).
200. Id. at 230. Note that these observations are generally the only part of
Marx's critique of rights which are acknowledged or discussed by most commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Asbjorn Eide, National Sovereignty and Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 10-11 (AsbJorn Eide & Bernt
Hagtvet eds., 1992).
201. By "idealist metaphysics" I refer to the position that concepts or abstrac-
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only trivialize the concrete, but to literally deny the reality of
the concrete; that, consequently, gratuitous human suffering is
tolerated and justified; and that the delusion proffered by the
idealism results in a crippling self-incapacitation, which pre-
vents those who suffer unjustly from acting to alter the social
structure.
In feudalism, Marx says, civil society had a directly politi-
cal character. That is, "the elements of civil life such as proper-
ty, family and the mode and manner of work were elevated in
the form of seignory, estate and guild to the level of elements
of political life."" 2
The political then becomes the realm of "the universal
concern of the people, ideally independent of those particular
elements of civil life."03 Modern bourgeois society is charac-
terized by a profound experience of bifurcation: we exist in two
realms-the political and the civil, the universal and the par-
ticular, the ideal and the material, the abstract and the con-
crete. Politically, a democracy "regards man-not just one man
but all men-as a sovereign and supreme being."0 4 As citi-
zen, each person in a democracy is literally deemed to be the
sovereign. The leaders are chosen "by the people;" their elec-
tion indicates "the will of the people;" their jobs are to "repre-
sent the people." A sovereign is the source of law and the en-
forcer of law; the sovereign ultimately holds all political power;
a crime committed by an individual against another individual
is an offense to the sovereign; the sovereign chooses to make
war or not; property, freedom and security are all granted to
individuals by the sovereign. As sovereign, then, the citizen is
all-powerful, subject to the whims and laws of no one, has at
his discretion the right to avail himself of all the wealth of the
land and has an army to carry out his will abroad and a police
force to enforce his will domestically. Yet, of course, the ordi-
nary citizen-the one who is neither king nor president nor
prime minister--does not have such a life, at least on the con-
crete level of day-to-day existence. The ordinary citizen will be
careful to obey the law so as not to be jailed. He will hope he
tions are treated as entities that are quite real and in fact more real than materi-
al entities.
202. MARX, supra note 199, at 232.
203. Id. at 233.
204. Id. at 225-26.
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has enough money to pay his rent and meet his needs. He will
be at the mercy of a dozen different forces: the whim of his
employer may send him out to the streets with no job; the
market may drive the cost of fuel so high he cannot afford heat
in the winter; he may be conscripted into the army and sent off
to kill or to be killed. The concrete reality of his daily life will
be characterized by fear, anxiety and helplessness in the face
of these forces. The power and privileges held by a sovereign
just do not characterize the texture of daily life for the individ-
ual. This is "man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, man in
his contingent existence, man just as he is, man as he has
been corrupted, lost to himself, sold, and exposed to the rule of
inhuman conditions and elements by the entire organization of
our society. .205
Yet with the Enlightenment notion of rights, the ideal
state we are in-insofar as we are citizens-is seen not as less
real, nor is it seen as fantasy or aspiration, but rather as the
higher reality. The language of rights posits a "true," original,
human nature, which is characterized by liberty, equality,
security, fraternity. It is in civil society that "the real man" has
his "sensuous, individual and immediate existence."2 6 The
citizen or the political man "is simply abstract, artificial man,
man as an allegorical, moral person. Actual man is acknowl-
edged only in the form of the egoistic individual and true man
only in the form of the abstract citizen."2 °7
Where the political state is fully developed as something
distinct from civil society, then, Marx says, man
leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not
only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives
in the political community, where he regards himself as a
communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a
private individual, regards other men as means, debases
himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien pow-
ers ... Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a
profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regard-
ed by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenome-
non. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered
to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a ficti-
205. Id. at 226.
206. Id. at 234.
207. Id.
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tious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and
filled with an unreal universality."
We need only look at the grammatical form in which the
social contract theorists and the revolutionary documents of
the Enlightenment declare the existence of rights to see what
Marx is talking about: the declarations of rights are not in the
future tense, the conditional tense, or the subjunctive mood.
They are in the present tense and the indicative mood, as
though they are descriptions of a present reality; and the de-
scriptions of the state of nature in the social contract writings
are in the past tense, as though they are descriptions of an
historical reality. In the introduction to his Discourse on the
Origin of Inequality, Rousseau actually says:
O man, whatever country you may be from, whatever your
opinions may be, listen: here is your history, as I have
thought to read it, not in the books of your fellowmen, who
are liars, but in nature, who never lies. Everything that co-
mes from nature will be true ....
Marx's description of the metaphysical dualism describes well
the paradox of the Enlightenment conception of rights: they
are abstractions which are reified and claim to be possessions;
they are ideals which claim to be factual states of affairs.
Let us now look at the basic structure of the paradox. Why
is it that a declaration of rights operates as a statement of a
present condition or a present possession, even though such a
claim is patently counterfactual? What are the underlying as-
sumptions, such that these claims are not dismissed immedi-
ately as fiction, fantasy, or moral aspiration? The assumption
must be that claims such as "All men are free and equal" refer
to a present reality-but an ideal reality, not the material one.
However, such a claim involves more than the notion of dual
realities. The declarations of rights do not say: "In one sense
we are free, in another, we are not. In an ideal sense we are
free, though obviously on a material level we are lot. On one
level, all human beings are entitled to dignity and equality;
yet, on another level, most human beings do not have that to
208. Id. at 220.
209. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in, ROUS-
SEAU, supra note 136, at 119, 119.
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which they are entitled, since they are routinely reduced to
desperation and humiliation, used and discarded by others,
their poverty deepening alongside of the increasing wealth of
others. In one realm we have many rights, in the other realm
we have no rights at all, only good or bad luck."
Obviously, the political and philosophical claims about
rights are not of this form. Rather, they operate only on the
level of the ideal-for example, "everyone has the right to be
treated with equal dignity and respect." This suggests a hierar-
chy within the dualism: it is the ideal reality which is the
truer reality and-the material world is in some sense less real.
It seems to me that this is what Marx is speaking to when he
distinguishes between "true reality" and "actual reality." In our
"true" nature, we are free, equal and entitled to dignity, pros-
perity and security. In our actual lives, however, which are
corrupt and distorted versions of our true selves, deformed and
limited by the conditions of material reality, we have none of
these qualities. The question demanded by the Enlightenment
conception of rights is: "How is it that our actual human condi-
tion does not constitute an irrefutable disproof of the claims
about the 'true nature' and 'inalienable entitlement' of human
beings?" The answer must be that there is a hierarchy: the
abstract and absolute claims are deemed real, while the histor-
ical and factual dimension of human existence are deemed to
be merely an appearance-a transient, contingent state, sub-
ject to change and consequently subject to disregard or
trivialization.
This also tells us something about what I referred to earli-
er as the "asymmetry" of the standard conception of human
rights. Not only does the standard conception reflect a certain
political and cultural perspective-that of Western First World
countries with highly developed formal political rights and
extreme economic disparities-but it also reiterates the para-
doxical structure of the Enlightenment notion of rights. Thus,
the standard notion treats political rights (which for most
people will be purely abstract or flatly counterfactual) as es-
sential and sees economic rights as vague, inessential, difficult
to justify and difficult to implement.
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VII. THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
AND THE SUPPRESSION OF MORAL DISCOURSE: THE
EXAMPLE OF NUREMBERG
At this point I would like to return to the Nuremberg
tribunal to explore the relationship between what was at
stake, on one hand, and the legitimacy of the concept and the
suppression of moral discourse, on the other. In the contexts of
both international law and ethical thought, the Nuremberg
tribunals hold a central role: they established the legal prece-
dent for all war crimes and human rights tribunals thereafter.
They also served as the prototype in international relations for
the moral denunciation of the acts of other nations as "crimes
against humanity."21 ° Yet, I will argue, even the Nuremberg
tribunals-which purported to be the unequivocal triumph of
justice and the rule of law over barbarity and evi121-- are
deeply intertwined with underlying political and rhetorical
agendas. Furthermore, while the Nuremberg tribunals purport-
ed to explore the legal and moral issues raised by the conduct
of the Nazi regime, in fact they controlled and severely re-
stricted moral and legal discourse. Because our contemporary
human rights discourse has all of these features, it may be
valuable to look at Nuremberg as the occasion on which they
first emerged. •
I will look specifically at the legal structure of the
Nuremberg trials and the tension between the political agenda
and judicial legitimacy. The tribunal has been criticized as
"victors' justice" on many occasions before, including by defense
counsel at Nuremberg. It might be observed that the tribunal's
structure would indeed offend our most basic sense of justice
and law were it not for the nature of the accusations. But it
seems to me compelling to go one step further as well and to
210. At the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961, the Nuremberg
Trials were cited as precedent for the Israeli court's claim of jurisdiction. See
HANNAH ARENDT, EicHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
254 (1963).
211. The opening statement of Robert Jackson, the prosecutor for the United
States, refers to the acts being condemned and punished as "calculated" and "ma-
lignant," and refers to the defendants as "evil" and "sinister." Opening Statement
for the United States of America by Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States at the Palace of Justice, Ndirnberg, Germany, Nov. 21, 1945 [here-
inafter Jackson, Opening Statement], in ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE
30-31 (1947).
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look at how it was that the question of the legality of the tribu-
nal could be so completely subsumed and trivialized by the
urgency of the tribunal. I will suggest that the political and
moral urgency of the trial not only was used to justify the
tribunal's patent illegality; but made it politically impossible
and morally impermissible to even raise the question of its
illegality.
The result, I would argue, is that our legacy from
Nuremberg is twofold. We have a notion of human rights,
which is commonly recognized in treaties, in international law
and in international organization; and for which there are now
established tribunals for the indictment, prosecution and pun-
ishment of those who commit human rights violations.212 Yet
at the same time, we inherit the view that "human rights vio-
lations" involve a moral claim which is not only sound and
good, but is flatly unquestionable. We inherit the view that no
rational member of the moral community could even question
the validity of such claims. It is as if to say: "Of course the acts
of the Nazis were unspeakable atrocities. How could any de-
cent human being defend the Nazis, on any grounds whatsoev-
er? Such a person would either have to be insane or devoid of
moral sensibilities. And of course the Nazis should be pun-
ished. What moral or rational person could dispute that? And
if there isn't exactly a law which was actually broken, the need
for decrying the Nazis as criminals is far greater than the duty
to abide by legal technicalities."
Indeed, this was the very language that appeared in the
documents establishing the Nuremberg tribunal, as well as the
documents generated by the tribunal. I will argue that the
need to achieve the moral end of punishing awful acts and the
need to achieve the political end of doing so publicly, not only
outweighed, but precluded altogether the possibility of discuss-
ing the correctness of the concept or the law.
212. This was the case, for instance, with the recent war crimes tribunals held
at the Hague, concerning the Bosnian conflict. See Mark R. von Sternberg, A Com-
parison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Juris.
diction and the 'Elementary Dictates of Humanity", 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 1'11
(1996); Anthony Goodman, U.N. Council Sets Up Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal,
in REUTER LIEBR. REP., May 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
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A. The Establishment of the Tribunal
The basic notion of the rule of law is the distinction be-
tween the "rule of law" and the "rule of men"--that is, that the
law is distinct from the will and desires of the king.
[Tihe doctrine of the rule of law means first "the absolute
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the influence of
arbitrariness of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary
authority on the part of government;" and secondly it means
"equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes
to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary
law courts."213
The "rule of law" involves the notions that the law exists
outside of particular rulers and particular subjects; that a
"crime" consists of violating the law, not simply displeasing the
ruler; that the person judging a claim must be different from
the person who claims to be injured; that an individual cannot
be punished for breaking a law which did not exist at the time
the individual acted; that law prohibits certain acts, rather
than simply naming and punishing individuals. The rule of law
"is contrasted with every system of government based on the
exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discre-
tionary powers of constraint."214 "Arbitrariness," in this con-
text, includes laws directed to particular individuals or particu-
lar acts (rather than general principles or classes of acts); laws
which are retroactive and penalize acts which were not illegal
at the time they were done; and laws whose meaning is uncer-
tain or whose application is unpredictable.215
213. 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 649 (1938) (quoting
ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 198 (7th ed. 1908)).
214. DICEY, supra note 213, at 188.
215. See Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political
Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 297, 303
(Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). Friedrich Hayek suggests that the notion of the "rule of
law" originates with Aristotle (although the phrase is often associated with
Hobbes), who wrote in the Politics that "'it is more proper that the law should
govern than any of the citizens.'" FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIB-
ERTY 164-65 (1960) (citations omitted). According to Hayek, one of the "achieve-
ments of the [English] Civil War was the abolition in 1641 of the prerogative
courts and especially the Star Chamber which had become, in F.W. Maitland's
often quoted words, 'a court of politicians enforcing a policy, not a court of judges
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Some of the most basic precepts of the U.S. Constitution
and American legal practice invoke this distinction. Criminal
defendants are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.
The bill of attainder clause in the Constitution prohibits the
legislature from passing a law which names individuals and
imposes penalties on them, while the ex post facto clause pro-
hibits the legislature from passing a law which punishes indi-
viduals retroactively for acts which did not violate any explicit
law at the time they were committed. 16 Judges who are re-
lated to either of the parties, or have an interest in the out-
come of a proceeding, must recuse themselves, or inform both
parties of the judge's interest and give the parties the opportu-
nity to request recusal. If a judge had a material interest in
the outcome of a case and refused to recuse himself, the par-
ties would be entitled to appeal that determination to a higher
court.
The "rule of law" entails that the rules of procedure for
court actions, such as rules of evidence, are generated by a
legislative or administrative body. They are articulated and
published prior to any court proceedings. If a judge issues a
ruling which is not consistent with the rules of procedure, a
party may appeal this error to a higher court. The court's juris-
diction is conferred prior to any case, before any particular
claims are brought; not as a vehicle for imposing a predeter-
mined punishment. Jurisdiction is granted by the constitution
or legislature, not created by the members of the same tribunal
upon which jurisdiction is conferred. 1' The parties are enti-
tled to challenge a court's jurisdiction and the court may not
administering the law.'" Id. The debate for the next twenty years focused on the
arbitrariness of law and government. The rule of law and the absence of arbitrari-
ness meant "that there must be no punishment without a previously existing law
providing for it, that all statutes should have only prospective and not retrospec-
tive operation, and that the discretion of all magistrates should be strictly circum-
scribed by law." Id. at 169 (citations omitted). Hayek notes that the rule of law
was applied to legislatures by Locke in the SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERN-
MENT'-a legislature "cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbi-
trary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject
by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges." Id. at 171 (citations
omitted).
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed.").
217. See id. art. III, § 1 (vesting the 'judicial Power of the United States" in
"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.").
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prohibit the parties from raising questions about the compe-
tence or appropriateness of the court to hear the case.
In a hearing in an American court in an ordinary matter,
it is hard to imagine a scenario in which these precepts were
violated without a reaction of shock or indignation. Imagine a
judge who is the brother of the plaintiff, where the plaintiff
and the judge discussed beforehand who the plaintiff could sue
such that the judge could guarantee a favorable outcome for
his brother. Would we not simply call that corruption? Imagine
a group of individuals who signed an agreement in which they
determined first that certain individuals should be punished;
then, consequently, the acts of those individuals must be de-
clared criminal; that the signatories themselves would be pros-
ecutors and judges; and that the defendants would be prohibit-
ed from questioning the legitimacy of the judges, the proce-
dure, or the tribunal itself. Would we not call that a "kangaroo
court?" And finally, imagine a situation in which a group of
persons declared themselves to be legislators and created a law
to punish their enemies; and the same parties who had created
the law then declared themselves empowered to prosecute
their enemies, judge the defendants and execute their own
judgments. Would we not consider this a gross violation of the
principle of separation of powers upon which the Constitution
is structured?
I use examples from American law in part because the
design of the Nuremberg tribunal was primarily attributable to
the Americans. " ' The problematic implications of the
tribunal's legitimacy and jurisdiction were discussed at length
by the architects of the tribunal, who included Francis Biddle
(the U.S. Attorney General, who was later one of the judges at
the tribunal) and Robert Jackson (the U.S. Supreme Court
218. As one scholar writes:
[Tihe Nuremberg trial system was created almost exclusively in Wash-
ington by a group of American government officials. The system was
developed, altered, and redrafted during the last ten months of the Euro-
pean war and was then presented to the British, Soviet, and French gov-
ernments for comment and concurrence at a four power conference held
in June-July 1945. America's allies modified and shifted features in the
United States plan, but its basic elements remained intact and were
embodied in the London Charter and the indictments that became the
legal ground rules for the main Nuremberg proceedings and for a series
of subsequent trials of Nazi and Japanese leaders.
BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 4-5 (1981).
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justice who was Chief Counsel for the U.S. prosecution team).
There were in fact lengthy exchanges over the design of the
tribunal, which involved the Departments of War, State, Trea-
sury, Justice, Navy, Office of Strategic Services and the White
House.21 Yet what was unquestioned was the fundamental
commitment to achieve a political aim by means. of a judicial
process; accompanied by indifference to or denial of the funda-
mental incompatibility of the political and judicial."' I do not
suggest here that the architects of the tribunal publicly and
explicitly acknowledged the political purpose of the trial, or
that they conceded that the claims to judicial legitimacy were
hollow. Indeed, it was the reverse. Robert Jackson's opening
statement to the tribunal lauds the triumph of the rule of law:
"That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with
injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their
captive enemies to the judgment of law is one of the most sig-
nificant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason."22 '
Jackson also pointed to the value the trial would hold for pos-
terity: "To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it
to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment
and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial will com-
219. TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 33. Note, however, that discussion of punish-
ment for Axis and Japanese war crimes had in fact been going on for some time
by the governments in exile and the UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCO). In
January 1942, the governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece,
Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia met in London, where they
drafted the St. James Declaration, calling for the "punishment, through the chan-
nel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes . ..."
Id. at 25. In October 1943, the UNWCC was formed to document war crimes. Its
members were Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France,
Greece, Holland, India, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, the Unit-
ed States and Yugoslavia. In the end, however, the individual countries held trials
for war crimes committed specifically in their territory; and the United States
(rather than the UNWCC) was the dominant force in the design and operation of
the Nuremberg tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes which were not limited
to a specific country. Id. See also Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law
of War and its Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 2022, 2057 (reviewing TELFORD
TAYLOR, NuREMBERG: THE MODERN LAW OF WAR AND ITs LIMITATIONS (1992)).
220. In a memorandum of June 1945, Telford Taylor, associate counsel for the
U.S. prosecution team, wrote that "the thing we want to accomplish is not a legal
thing but a political thing." Quoting the memorandum, he wrote later in his mem-
oirs that the "ex post facto problem"-that the tribunal was prosecuting individu-
als for laws which did not exist at the time of their acts-was "not a bothersome
question 'if we keep in mind that this is a political decision to declare and apply
a principle of international law." TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 50, 51.
221. JACKSON, supra note 211, at 31.
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mend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to
do justice."222
Yet the Nuremberg tribunal was indeed a political event
and it was indeed devised to address a political problem. Jack-
son observed, in his June 1945 report to President Truman,
that there are men whom we have cause to accuse of culpabili-
ty in atrocities.2 "We have many such men in our posses-
sion," he wrote, "What shall we do with them?"" He an-
swered:
We could, of course, set them at large without a hearing. But
it has cost unmeasured thousands of American lives to beat
and bind these men. To free them without a trial would mock
the dead and make cynics of the living. On the other hand,
we could execute or otherwise punish them without a hear-
ing. But undiscriminating executions or punishments without
definite findings of guilt, fairly arrived at, would violate
pledges repeatedly given and would not set easily on the
American conscience or be remembered by our children with
pride. The only other course is to determine the innocence or
guilt of the accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the
times and horrors we deal with will permit, and upon a re-
cord that will leave our reasons and motives clear.2"
Thus the most immediate political problem that the tribu-
nal was to solve was simply: "now that we have all these Nazis
in our possession-what exactly are we supposed to do with
them?" It is worth noting that the idea of holding a trial was
quite controversial among the Allied governments. This is not
because there were questions of how to justify the legitimacy
and jurisdiction of a judicial process used for political aims. 26
222. Id. at 34.
223. Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, June 6, 1945 [hereinafter
Report to the President] in ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON:
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY
TRIALS 42, 46 (1945) [hereinafter LONDON CONFERENCE REPORT] (Dep't. of State
Publication No. 3080, 1949) (providing a "documentary record of negotiations ...
culminating in ... the International Military Tribunal.").
224. LONDON CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 223, at 46.
225. Id.
226. I do not mean to suggest that no one was concerned about the judicial
legitimacy of the tribunals. Within the U.S. government, during the period of in-
ternal debate over the nature and structure of the tribunal, there were some who
did indeed question the legitimacy of certain aspects of the project. In December
1944, an attorney in the Judge Advocate General Corps, Lieutenant Alwyn Vernon
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Rather, it was because a trial was seen as a cumbersome and
uncertain way of dealing with the Nazis held by occupation
forces. The more expeditious solution was simply to shoot
them.
This was the policy proposed by Henry Morgenthau, the
Secretary of the Treasury, which was initially adopted by Roo-
sevelt. Morgenthau proposed that the names of the major war
criminals should be distributed to the Allied Forces, with in-
structions to capture, identify and shoot anyone on the list.
Morgenthau also proposed the "pastoralization" of Germany,
which involved stripping Germany of its industrial capacity
and reducing it to a nation of farmers. 27 Ironically mirroring
Nazi policy, Morgenthau proposed putting all members of the
SS in concentration camps, but then eventually relocating
them outside of Germany, noting that they could not be in-
terned in concentration camps forever.22 Older children
would be confined and banished as well. It was unclear what
would happen to children under six." In September 1944,
Roosevelt met with Churchill in Quebec to discuss post-war
policy. Morgenthau attended the meeting and presented his
plan. Churchill and Roosevelt initialed a summary of the
Morgenthau plan and Roosevelt came out in favor of summari-
ly executing the Nazi leaders. °
This was also the position held by the British. A British
Freeman, wrote a detailed legal memorandum questioning the validity of the no-
tion that launching a war was a "crime" which could be punished. According to
one historian, this document represented the views of two of the generals at Judge
Advocate General Corps (JAG). See SMITH, supra note 218, at 103. At the same
time, Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler addressed other issues of this
sort in a memo to his superior Francis Biddle. Biddle would later be one of the
judges at the tribunal. Wechsler objected to the idea of trying Nazi organizations
as defendants, inasmuch as the idea of a trying an organization was without pre-
cedent. There was, of course, the notion of conspiracy, but conspiracy was peculiar
to Anglo-American law; it did not exist in continental law. Wechsler also objected
to bringing charges against German nationals that were based on ex post facto
crimes. See ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 57 (1984) (additional-
ly observing that continental legal systems did have some concepts-the association
criminel of France, Germany's Criminal associates, the "sweeping charges" Russia
designed to "deal with banditry"-that bore a family resemblance to conspiracy but
did not treat "the mere act of conspiracy . . . as a crime."). The objections of both
Wechsler and Freeman were overridden.
227. See SITH, supra note 218, at 36-37 (discussing the Morgenthau Plan).
228. See id. at 28.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 47.
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memorandum from April 1945 stated:
It being conceded that these leaders must suffer death, the
question arises whether they should be tried by some form of
tribunal claiming to exercise judicial functions, or whether
the decision taken by the Allies should be reached and en-
forced without the machinery of a trial. But H.M.G. are also
deeply impressed with the dangers and difficulties of this
course and they wish to put before their principal Allies, in a
connected form, the arguments which have led them to think
that execution without trial is the preferable course."'
The British held this position consistently until late May
1945Y 2
The reason for this course of action was twofold: a trial
would be "exceedingly long and elaborate," but also it might
reveal the illegitimacy of the proceedings. Many of the Nazi
transgressions "are not war crimes in the ordinary sense, nor
is it at all clear that they can properly be described as crimes
under international law." 3
While the immediate purpose of the tribunals was to sim-
ply do something with the Nazi prisoners on hand, there were
other objectives as well, which were somewhat grander in
scope: to justify the casualties suffered in the war by the Al-
lies, to preserve the truth for future historians, to teach a
lesson to all humanity, to prove that-by virtue of the Allies'
231. Aide-M~moire from the United Kingdom, April 23, 1945, in LONDON CON-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 223, at 18, 18; see also RICHARD H. MINEAR,
VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMEs TRIAL 9 (1971) (discussing the initial
British preference for "executive action," as opposed to "judicial proceedings.").
232. In August 1942, Anthony Eden told the European leaders that it was
"undesirable" to pursue "a policy of bringing [the Nazi leaders] to trial." TUSA &
TUSA, supra note 226, at 61-62.
In May 1944 Eden proposed compiling a short list of Nazi war criminals
(less than fifty) who were sufficiently notorious that their guilt could be assumed
without resort to legal proceedings and without offending public opinion. See id. at
63.
In April 1945, Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, presented a memorandum
to the Americans reiterating the British objections to a trial, objections the British
maintained through the end of May 1945. A proper hearing would allow the defen-
dante to put forth evidence that would be embarrassing to the Allies. The better
route to take would be for the Allies to proceed by "joint executive action," which
meant summary execution. See id. at 64.
233. See Aide-M~moire from the United Kingdom, April 23, 1945, in LONDON
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 223, at 19. See also MINEAR, supra note 231, at
9.
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triumph-justice was vindicated in the end. 4 I would sug-
gest that perhaps the singular and most compelling purpose
was simply for the Allies to demonstrate the righteousness of
their own cause and the evil of their enemies. Jackson was
quite candid in his opening statement in saying that the trial
did not have all that much to do with the actual defendants; it
was rather their symbolism that was of value.
In the prisoners' dock sit twenty-odd broken men.... Merely
as individuals, their fate is of little consequence to the world.
What makes this inquest significant is that these prison-
ers represent sinister influences that will lurk in the world
long after their bodies have returned to dust. They are living
symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism and violence, and of
the arrogance and cruelty of power. They are symbols of
fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue and war-
making which have embroiled Europe generation after gener-
ation, crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and im-
poverishing its life."
For clearly the purpose of the Nuremberg tribunal was not
to examine "the war crimes and crimes against humanity com-
234. In his memo of June 2, 1945 to the prosecution team, Taylor argued that
the two most important things to be accomplished by the trials were "[t]o give
meaning to the war against Germany[,J [t]o validate the casualties we have suf-
fered" and '[t1o establish and maintain harmonious relations with the other United
Nations in the presentation and successful prosecution of the case." TAYLOR, supra
note 20, at 50.
In his closing address to the tribunal, made on behalf of the United King-
dom, Sir Hartley Shawcross said that the tribunal has conducted the proceedings
"both that justice may be done to these individuals as to their countless victims,
and also that the world may know that in the end the predominance of power will
be driven out and law and justice shall govern the relations between States." Sir
Hartley Shawcross, Closing Address for United Kingdom, Great Britain and Ire-
land, in OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AxIS
CRIINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 61, 62 (Supp. A 1947) [hereinafter
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION].
M. Champetier de Ribes, France's chief prosecutor, believed that "the inter-
esting point of these trials is above all that of historical truth. Thanks to them,
the historian of the future, as well as the chronicler of today, will know the truth
about the political, diplomatic and military events of the most tragic period in our
history; he will know the crimes of Nazism as well as the hesitancies, the weak-
nesses, the omissions of the pacific democracies." M. Champetier de Ribes, Intro-
duction to M. Dubost, Closing Argument for the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra, at 159, 159 (Supp.
A).
235. Jackson, Opening Statement, supra note 211, at 31.
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mitted during the course of the war." If this were the case,
then all such acts would have been examined. All persons-of
whatever nationality-who had committed them would have
been potential defendants. But this was not the case. Rather, it
would seem that the fundamental purpose of the Nuremberg
proceedings was for the victors to display to the world the evil
done by the vanquished. Thus, the victors created the tribunal,
legislated the crime, appointed themselves prosecutors, ap-
pointed themselves justices and found the vanquished guilty.
B. The Structure of the Tribunal
Although both the prosecutors and the tribunal itself pur-
ported at various times to be acting on behalf of mankind in
general,236  all civilized nations, 7  civilization itself,238  or
"an overwhelming majority of all civilized people," 9 in fact
236. In his closing argument for the Soviet Union, Lt. Gen. R.A. Rudenko stat-
ed that [m]ankind calls the criminals to account; and on the behalf of mankind
we, the prosecutors, accuse at this trial." R-.A Rudenko, Closing Argument for
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra
note 234, at 199, 199 (Supp. A).
237. The judgment of the tribunal states that the making of the Nuremberg
Charter was the exercise of the four powers' "sovereign legislative power." "[T]he
undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been
recognized by the civilized world." Judgment, in 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE
TRIBUNAL, supra note 21, at 171, 218.
238. "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish," said Jackson in his
opening statement, "have been so calculated, so malignant and devastating, that
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored .... Civilization can afford no
compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal
ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously
survive." Jackson, Opening Statement, supra note 211, at 30-31. The Allied re-
sponse to the German threat is described in the following terms: "At length besti-
ality and bad faith reached such excess that they aroused the sleeping strength of
imperiled Civilization. Its united efforts have ground the German war machine to
fragments." Id at 32.
239. In addressing the Nuremberg Tribunal, Jackson explained that their char-
ter "does not express the views of the signatory nations alone. Other nations with
diverse but highly respected systems of jurisprudence also have signified adherence
to it. These are Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia,
Luxembourg, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras,
Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela and India. You judge, therefore, under an organ-
ic act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice and the will of twenty-one
governments, representing an overwhelming majority of all civilized people." Jack-
son, Opening Statement, supra note 211, at 80. It is interesting to note that this
portion of Jackson's Opening statement allows for the inference that the many
nations not participating-those making up most of Asia, Africa and Latin Ameri-
ca-are outside the majority of civilized people and therefore are generally not
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they were acting explicitly and solely on behalf of the victors in
the European theater. This is explicit in the formal structure
of the tribunal and in the documents of its establishment,
including the very caption of the case." ° The tribunal was
established pursuant to the London Agreement of August 8,
1945. 2" The signatories on the London Agreement consisted
of the four powers-the United States, France, the United
Kingdom and the USSR. Nineteen other countries, all of them
Allies, expressed their "adherence." The accompanying Charter
of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter)
provided for the composition, jurisdiction and powers of the
tribunal. Article 1 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that,
"[uin pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of
August 1945... there shall be established an International
Military Tribunal... for the just and prompt trial and punish-
ment of the major war criminals of the European Axis."242
Thus, the document itself is a bill of attainder: it is an act of
legislation passed for the purpose of punishing particular per-
sons (only those in the Axis nations), rather than a law of
general applicability, which names the acts to 'be punished,
regardless of who commits them. The Nuremberg Charter, in
framing the Tribunal's jurisdiction this way, literally precluded
the tribunal from hearing claims of war crimes committed by
the Allies (though that would have been unlikely in any event,
civilized.
240. The caption of the case reads:
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
-against-
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von
RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, [et al.]
NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, supra note 234, at iii (Supp. A).
241. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Pro-
visional Government of the French Republc, the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter London Agreement].
242. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, art. 1, 59 Stat. at 1546, 82 U.N.T.S.
at 284. This is reiterated in Article 6, which stated that "[t]he Tribunal . . . shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the Eu-
ropean Axis countries, whether as individuals or members of organisations, commit-
ted any of the following crimes." Id. art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286
(emphasis added).
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since the prosecutors were the Allies).
This was quite intentional: the architects of the tribunal
intended to ensure that claims of war crimes committed by the
Allies, or a description of the pre-war condition of Germany,
would not be heard. The fire-bombing of Dresden, the use of
atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the violation
of rules of submarine warfare were all acts committed by the
Allies which would have been well-suited for treatment as war
crimes, if the tribunal had been concerned with war crimes as
such, rather than the war crimes of the European Axis. The
drafters of the Nuremberg Charter were concerned that the
defendants would raise the issue of Allied war crimes and were
careful to prevent such "propaganda." Robert Jackson voiced
this concern at the conference in London that drafted the
tribunal's charter:
There is a very real danger of this trial being used, or of an
attempt being made to use it, for propaganda purposes...,
It seems to me that the chief way in which the Germans can
use this forum as a means of disseminating propaganda is by
accusing other countries of various acts which they will say
led them to make war defensively. That would be ruled out of
this case if we could find and adopt proper language which
would define what we mean when we charge a war of aggres-
sion. Language has been used in a number of treaties which
defines aggression and limits it in such a way that it would
prevent their making these counter-accusations which would
take lots of time and cause lots of trouble.2"
That the tribunals were designed to punish per-
sons-rather than to establish and enforce a law applicable to
all-is also explicit in the discussions in 1944 and 1945 in
which the idea of the tribunal was formulated. At the London
conference where the Nuremberg Charter was drafted, for
example, the chief British representative, Sir David Maxwell
Fyfe, made it clear that he did not want certain individuals to
escape prosecution:
What is in my mind is getting a man like Ribbentrop or Ley.
It would be a great pity if we failed to get Ribbentrop or Ley
243. Minutes of Conference Session, July 17, 1945, in LONDON CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 223, at 262, 273. See also MINEAR, supra note 231, at 55-56.
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or Streicher. Now I want words that will leave no doubt that
men who have originated the plan or taken part in the early
stages of the plan are going to be within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. I do not want any argument that Ribbentrop
did not direct the preparation because he merely was over-
borne by Hitler, or any nonsense of that kind.'"
There was no presumption of innocence; indeed, the tribu-
nal was designed specifically to ensure that trial would result
in conviction. This conclusion was reached by one historian,
Richard Minear, who wrote that
[alt least three of the four parties to the London Conference
explicitly presupposed the conviction of the accused. The
British Government began an early aide-memoire: "H.M.G.
assume that it is beyond question that Hitler and a number
of arch-criminals associated with him (including Mussolini)
must, so far as they fall into Allied hands, suffer the penalty
of death for their conduct leading up to the war and for the
wickedness which they either themselves perpetrated or have
authorized in the conduct of the war." The Soviet representa-
tive at the London Conference stated: "We are dealing here
with the chief war criminals who have already been convicted
and whose conviction has been already announced by both
the Moscow and Crimea declarations...." And Robert H.
Jackson, while attacking the assumption behind the Soviet
representative's statement, nevertheless felt "bound to con-
cede" that "[tihere could be but one decision in this case."2"
Perhaps the most striking feature which undermined the
tribunal's claim to judicial legitimacy was simply that exactly
the same parties-in some cases, the same individuals-were
the legislators, prosecutors and judges. The "legislature" was
not a neutral or broad-based international organization. The
"legislature" consisted of the four powers, the victors, simply
negotiating among themselves as to what should be done with
the vanquished. Negotiating for the United States was Robert
Jackson; for France, Robert Falco; for the United Kingdom,
Jowitt; and for the U.S.S.R., Major General I.T. Nikitchenko
and A. Trainin. These parties quite literally determined by
244. Minutes of Conference Session, July 19, 1945, in LONDON CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 223, at 295, 301. See also MINEAR, supra note 231, at 37.
245. MINEAR, supra note 231, at 18.
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agreement that the acts of the Nazis had been "crimes," and
that there would be a court before which these crimes could be
tried. Neither the prosecutors in this newly-created court nor
the judges would be drawn from neutral countries, but rather
would come from the victors-turned-legislators. 6 The legisla-
tive, judicial and prosecutorial functions were deeply inter-
twined; this was particularly obvious where exactly the same
individuals simply changed hats and took on new roles. Jack-
son, who had negotiated the final charter on behalf of the
United States, was the lead prosecutor for the United States.
Francis Biddle, the U.S. Attorney General who had also been
deeply involved in formulating the structure of the tribu-
nal,4 7 was the judge appointed by the United States. Sir Da-
vid Maxwell-Fyfe, who was involved in negotiating the
Nuremberg Charter for the United Kingdom, was deputy chief
prosecutor for the U.K. at the trial. The Soviet Union appoint-
ed Nikitchenko, who had negotiated the Nuremberg Charter on
behalf of the U.S.S.R., as judge. The French appointed Falco,
who had negotiated the Nuremberg Charter on behalf of
France, as judge.
The Allies justified this partly by maintaining that there
were no neutral countries and that it would make no sense to
let the Germans judge themselves. Thus, by process of elimina-
tion, the victors must take on the task. Jackson himself said:
Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both
prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over
vanquished foes. The world-wide scope of the aggressions car-
ried out by these men has left but few real neutrals. Either
the victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the
defeated to judge themselves.'
246. Article 2 of the Nuremberg Charter provides that "[tihe Tribunal shall
consist of four members, each with an alternate. One member and one alternate
shall be appointed by each of the Signatories." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21,
art. 2, 59 Stat. at 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. at 284. Article 14 provides that "[elach Sig-
natory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the investigation of the charges against
and the prosecution of major war criminals." Id. art. 14, 59 Stat. at 1549, 82
U.N.T.S. at 292.
247. Biddle co-authored the "Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the
Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General, January 22, 1945," which
concerned the structure and justification of the tribunals. See Editorial Note to
Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and War and the
Attorney General, in LONDON CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 223, at 3.
248. Jackson, Opening Statement, supra note 211, at 33.
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Yet this was not so. Within Europe, Switzerland, Sweden
and Portugal were neutral; and outside of Europe, many coun-
tries in Latin America and Africa were neutral, or had very
limited involvement in the war.24 9
The tribunal's jurisdiction and legitimacy were alternative-
ly justified, by the Tribunal itself, as occupation law:
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich
unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of
these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has
been recognized by the civilized world....
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the
law it was to administer and made regulations for the proper
conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together
what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to
be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up spe-
cial courts to administer law." °
Yet this flies in the face of the claim that it is not victory
that gives the right of the victors to judge the vanquished, but
rather law.
The procedural rules likewise reflected the Allies' concern
to control the proceedings and determine their outcome. In
American law, the rules of judicial procedure are promulgated
either by the court or the legislature and are equally applicable
to all parties. However, the Nuremberg Charter provided that
the prosecutors were to draw up rules of procedure, which they
were to submit to the tribunal for review, acceptance, or rejec-
tionY The defense had no input into this process. The de-
fense was not permitted to submit alternate rules, ol" in fact to
249. Article 5 of the London Agreement provided that "[a]ny Government of the
United Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through diplomatic
channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other
signatory and adhering Governments of each such adherence." London Agreement,
supra note 241, art. 5, 59 Stat: at 1545, 82 U.N.T.S. at 282. Only nineteen coun-
tries did so: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Po-
land, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Hai-
ti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay. See TUSA & TUSA,
supra note 226, at 85, n.*.
250. Judgment, in 1 OFFIcIAL DocuMENTs OF THE TRIBUNAL, supra note 21, at
171, 218.
251. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, art. 14(e), 59 Stat. at 1549, 82
U.N.T.S. at 292.
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comment or contribute in any way to the formulation of the
rules of procedure.
Not surprisingly, the defense attempted to object to these
features of the tribunal:
[T]he Defense consider it their duty to point out at this junc-
ture another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the
commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. The
Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which were
the one party in this war. This one party to the proceeding is
all in one: creator of the statute of the Tribunal and of the
rules of law, prosecutor and judge. It used to be until now the
common legal conception that this should not be so; just as
the United States of America, as the champion for the insti-
tution of international arbitration and jurisdiction, always
demanded that neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of
all parties, should be called to the Bench. This principle has
been realized in an exemplary manner in the case of the
Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. 2
The defense counsel did not ask that the tribunal be dis-
banded, but rather that the tribunal seek an opinion by "inter-
nationally recognized authorities on international law on the
legal elements of this Trial under the Charter of the Tribu-
nal.,53
The question of jurisdiction is not trivial, since jurisdiction
entails the basic right of the court to hear a case and render
judgment. The proceedings of a court are not legitimate or
binding if the court does not have jurisdiction. Given that the
tribunal had not existed prior to 1945 and that jurisdiction was
conferred by the victors upon themselves, the challenge to the
tribunal's jurisdiction was predictable. The designers of the
tribunal had anticipated such objections-and prohibited them.
Article 3 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that "[neither
the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be chal-
lenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Coun-
sel."' There were no additional grounds for conferring juris-
diction, other than the Nuremberg Charter and the London
252. Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel, Nov. 19, 1945, in 1 OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIBUNAL, supra note 21, at 168-70.
253. Id. at 170.
254. Nuremberg Charter, art. 3, 59 Stat. at 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286.
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agreement. 5 The jurisdiction question was "resolved" by
simply prohibiting its introduction before the Tribunal or any
other international body. The defendants' motion was rejected
immediately. 6
The Tokyo trials of the Japanese leaders had the same
obvious and explicit features of a political show trial by the
victors. The Tokyo tribunal was not even created by agreement
255. It must be mentioned that the nature and legitimacy of the tribunal's
jurisdiction was thoroughly researched and hotly debated, particularly by the U.S.
officials who were involved in devising the plans for the tribunal. See generally
SMITH, supra note 218. In the end, the rationale for the tribunal relied heavily on
two sources. The first involves the customary rules of war, which prohibit direct
attacks on civilians and wounded combatants and also prohibit torture, the sum-
mary execution of prisoners of war, etc. However, there was no precedent for a
foreign power to bring criminal charges against individuals who are not their own
citizens, nor to try and punish them. The second source consisted mainly of trea-
ties and declarations issued in the aftermath of World War I, denouncing war as
a means of international dispute resolution. The tribunal and the Allies relied
heavily on the Kellogg-Briand Treaty (the Pact of Paris) of 1928, which was bind-
ing on 63 nations, including Germany, Italy and Japan. Articles I and II of that
treaty read:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solu-
tion of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations to one another.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except
by pacific means.
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, arts. 1, 2, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 63.
However, the Pact did not provide for a mechanism of enforcement of these
promises. Treaty violations had always been addressed diplomatically, or in the
form of actions for breach of contract in international courts. The unilateral deter-
mination that the treaty constituted criminal law and that the Germans were
"criminals" to be tried individually, by foreign powers, was not a concept that had
been recognized or a procedure that had ever been employed prior to the
Nuremberg Charter. The tribunal also relied heavily on a protocol of the League
of Nations which stated that "a war of aggression... is an international crime."
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 2, 1924, art. 2,
L.N.O.J., Spec. Supp., No. 23, at 498. However, the protocol was never ratified;
and at the time the Protocol was recommended, Germany was not a member of
the League of Nations. See Judgment, in 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIBU-
NAL, supra note 21, at 216-24. The tribunal also relied on other resolutions after
World War I which denounced wars of aggression as "international crimes." How-
ever, the concept and procedure of trying and punishing individual government
officials, as criminals, for their government's war of aggression, was clearly novel.
256. The motion was rejected on November 21, 1945. See Motion Adopted by
All Defense Counsel, Nov. 19, 1945, in 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRIBUNAL,
supra note 21, at 168, n.*.
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of several countries; it was created by the "Proclamation by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers," which was Gener-
al Douglas MacArthur."5 The charter for that tribunal was
written by Americans, primarily Joseph B. Keenan, who would
also be the chief prosecutor." Like the Nuremberg tribunal,
the judges for the Tokyo trials were drawn from the victor
nations. 9 Like the Nuremberg trials, the Tokyo tribunal did
not consider possible war crimes committed by the Allies; evi-
dence regarding the American use of atomic weapons was not
admissible.260 Like the Nuremberg trials, the Tokyo tribunal
did not promulgate clear rules of evidence.26' Despite the
claim of the tribunals to be applying law in an impartial man-
ner, the positions of the particular justices did indeed, to some
extent, reflect their and their nations' losses. In the
Nuremberg trial, the Soviet judge wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he objected to the tribunal's leniency. 62 In the Tokyo
257. The proclamation read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers, by virtue of the authority so conferred upon me, in
order to implement the Terms of Surrender which requires the meting
out of stern justice to war criminals, do order and provide as follows:
Article 1. There shall be established an International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East...
Article 2. The Constitution, jurisdiction and functions of this Tribu-
nal are those set forth in the charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, approved by me this day.
Douglas MacArthur, Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, reprinted in, 1 THE TOKYO WAR
CR IEs TRiAL (1981).
258. See MINEAR, supra note 231, at 20.
259. There were eleven judges for the Tokyo trial, one each from Australia,
Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the
Philippines, the Soviet Union and the United States. See id. at 23.
260. See id. at 100. It should be noted that the Charter does not explicitly
name the Japanese as the objects of prosecution. Article 1 provides that the tribu-
nal is established "for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals in the Far East." Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20, reprinted in
MINEAR, supra note 231, at 185 (as amended Apr. 26, 1946). Although the tribunal
in principle could have exercised jurisdiction over American war crimes, it obvious-
ly did not choose to do so.
261. The Charter provides that "The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical
rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expedi-
tious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to
have probative value." Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, supra note 260, art. 13.
262. The Tribunal acquitted defendants Schacht, von Papen and Fritzsche; sen-
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tribunal, two justices dissented: Justice Jaranilla of the Philip-
pines, who was a survivor of the Bataan Death March, objected
to the tribunal's leniency; and Justice Pal of India, a country
which had suffered very little at the hands of Japan, acquitted
all defendants, partly on the grounds that the tribunal was a
political rather than judicial entity, which had no right or
jurisdiction to try the defendants.263
C. What We Inherit From Nuremberg
How do we make sense of the architecture of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals? How do we make sense of the
multiple levels of protection against even the slimmest possi-
bility that someone might mention the war crimes of the Allies
or question the legitimacy of the tribunals? These layers of
protection ensured not just that the monstrous acts of the
Nazis and Japanese would be revealed to the world, but also
that the relative goodness of the Allies would be demonstrated
and that the Allied nations would feel vindicated and feel their
sacrifices justified. Surely this would also have been accom-
plished with a genuinely judicial tribunal-where the justices
were not also representatives of the plaintiff nations; where all
those who committed war crimes would be prosecuted, not just
the Axis nations. In a legitimate judicial structure, with neu-
tral justices, explicit rules of evidence and so on-surely the
result would have been nearly the same. The fire-bombing of
Dresden-and even the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki-would still have paled alongside the German death
tenced Hess to life imprisonment and found that the Reichs-cabinet, the General
Staff and high command of the armed forces were not criminal organizations. The
Soviet dissent objected to all of these. See Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Mem-
ber of the International Military Tribunal, in 1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE TRI-
BUNAL, supra note 21, at 342.
263. In his dissent, Pal wrote:
Whatever view of the legality or otherwise of a war may be taken, victo-
ry does not invest the victor with unlimited and undefined power now.
International laws of war define and regulate the rights and duties of
the victor over the individuals of the vanquished nationality. In my judg-
ment, therefore, it is beyond the competence of any victor nation to go
beyond the rules of international law as they exist, give new definitions
of crimes, and then punish the prisoners for having committed offenses
according to this new definition.
Remarks Concerning the Opinion of the Member for India (Pal), in 21 THE TOKYO
WAR CRIMES TRIAL 32 (1981). See also MINEAR, supra note 231, at 63-64.
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camps. But it seems that nearly the same wasn't good enough.
This tells us a great deal about the project of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals. The project was not at all about which of
the various nations had done the worst things-given that war
and aggression are inherently bloody and extreme, it is noth-
ing new in human history when ethics and honor take a back
seat in wartime to fear, vengeance, or desire for victory. The
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials-in both their structure and their
rhetoric-do not concern evil acts, but rather assert an essen-
tial distinction between evil human beings and righteous ones.
We can now make sense of the process by which the politi-
cal is transformed and presented in the garb of the judicial; in
which the interest of particular nations is transformed and
presented as an interest that is universal (the interest of man-
kind, the interest of Civilization, the interest of all civilized
nations); in which interest itself is transformed and presented
as law. The Nuremberg project was never about acts which
were indefensible, shocking, or evil; but rather about persons
who were monstrous, beastly, not even human.
This is what lies at the heart of Hannah Arendt's
EICHmANN IN JERUSALEM. 26 Recall Arendt's elaborate de-
scriptions of Eichmann's ordinariness, his shallowness and
self-absorption, his inability to speak without reliance on
clich6s and his inability to fully separate reality from a trite
and hackneyed unreality. Although the work was received in
some quarters as a justification of Nazism, a defense of
Eichmann personally, or a trivialization of the Holocaust,
265
clearly it is none of these things. Rather, it suggests that there
264. Arendt's depiction of Eichmann suggests that it is almost as though he
had spent his life in a B-rate movie and the line between fiction and non-fiction
was blurred, or occasionally lost altogether. "Adolf Eichmann went to the gallows
with great dignity," Arendt writes. She describes his last words:
He began by stating emphatically that he was a Gottgleubiger, to express
in common Nazi fashion that he was no Christian and did not believe in
life after death. He then proceeded: "After a short while, gentlemen, we
shall all meet again. Such is the fate of all men. Long live Germany,
long live Argentina, long live Austria. I shall not forget them." In the
face of death, he had found the cliche used in funeral oratory. Under the
gallows, his memory played him the last trick; he was "elated" and he
forgot that this was his own funeral.
ARENDT, supra note 210, at 252.
265. See, e.g., Michael A. Musmanno, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REVIEW, May 19, 1963
(review of ARENDT, supra note 210).
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is nothing intrinsically monstrous about Eichmann-if he had
lived in different times, he might have been a vacuum cleaner
salesman. If he was so ordinary and the situation gave him the
possibility and motivation for behaving monstrously, then in a
sense, none of us is "safe"-we all have within us the potential
to commit monstrous acts. The acts are no less monstrous for
this reason. Yet once we acknowledge Eichmann's ordinari-
ness-once we acknowledge that his acts rather than his per-
son were evil-then we can never in good conscience be certain
that any of us is righteous. We can never be certain that we
ourselves would not do monstrous things-not out of a con-
scious bloodthirstiness, but out of indifference, shallowness, or
a kind of willing myopia.
Arendt's insight is echoed by the Costa Rican theologian
Franz Hinkelanmert, in an article on the Persian Gulf War.
Hinkelammert describes some of the language used by George
Bush, Norman Schwartzkopf, military officials and soldiers
involving the notion of "work." They use expressions like: "We
had a job to do, and we went in there and did it;" "We've been
getting to our targets and getting the job done," and so on.
Hinkelammert notes that such language treats destruction as
a productive process; it is as though the factory that produced
Baghdad's destruction were comparable to a factory that pro-
duces shoes. But, he says, only the executioner thinks his is a
job like everyone else's. 6
And that is the heart of the problem: there are many
means by which executioners convince themselves that their
jobs are like everyone else's. Executioners do not come into the
world with the mark of Cain on their brows, any more than
the righteous come with a saintly glow. If we deem acts, rather
than persons, to be evil, then we acknowledge the possibility
(at least in principle) that all of us, any of us, may do evil at
some time. If we deem acts, rather than persons, to be evil,
then we are compelled to acknowledge that the human condi-
tion requires us to struggle not only with temptation and
weakness, but with the resolution of moral ambiguity as well.
Like the executioners, we may convince ourselves that the
particular acts we are doing are justified because we do them
266. See Franz J. Hinkelammert, Subjectividad y Nuevo Orden Mundial: jQud
Queda Despuis de la Guerra de Irak?, 1991 PASOS 18, 20.
784 [Vol. XXII:3
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
in the name of the law, or that our acts bear the righteousness
of our cause. Consequently, there may be a moment in history,
or in our daily lives, in which we indeed are the executioners.
If we deem persons, rather than acts, to be evil, we create
the illusion that we can somehow transcend the moral strug-
gle. If they are evil and we are acting on behalf of the innocent,
the good and mankind as a whole, then there is simply no
ambiguity to resolve. There are only two issues we then need
address: the list and decorum. Whose names shall we place on
the list of those who are evil; and what should we do to them
once we have them, that won't be too distasteful?
Far from resolving any ethical questions, the structure and
rhetoric of the war crimes tribunals avoid the most pressing of
the ethical issues raised by the Holocaust and the Nazi regime.
How is it that human beings come to do evil acts? By equating
the interests of the Allies with the interests of all humanity
and by precluding even the possibility that war crimes by the
Allies could even be mentioned, it seems to me that the archi-
tects of the tribunals were doing more than simply satisfying
the post-war political interests of the Allies. The tribunals' fun-
damental assumption was that the accusers were righteous
and the condemned were evil; this was both explicit and im-
plicit in the structure and rhetoric of the tribunals. This as-
sumption rested on a very basic distinction. We are fundamen-
tally different kinds of creatures than they are; we are civi-
lized, they are barbaric; we are human and they are something
less than human-monstrous, animal, demonic. That is a dan-
gerous view to hold. It is also part of the legacy we inherit
from the tribunals where the concept of human rights first
took on the character of law.
An equally important piece of the Nuremberg legacy is the
advancement of a political and moral agenda by judicial
means. While the atrocities committed in the Holocaust are
bone-chilling, it is nonetheless shocking to see what a travesty
the Nuremberg tribunal was from the perspective of judicial
legitimacy. If the same method of legislation and procedure for
trial had been followed in any domestic court of the Allied
nations, it would have been denounced as patently illegitimate;
if such a trial were held in American courts, it would have
been patently unconstitutional on multiple grounds. We need
only imagine such a court today, anywhere in the world, struc-
tured in the same manner: where the legislator, prosecutor and
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judge were all the same party; the legislation was explicitly
created for the purpose of punishing certain individuals; the
standards for evidence and procedure left to the discretion of
the tribunal; and the tribunal's jurisdiction was created and
conferred by the plaintiff, who then prohibited the defense
from raising the issue of jurisdiction, before the tribunal itself
or elsewhere. If such a court were to operate today in any
domestic setting, we would consider it patently illegitimate and
void of any judicial integrity. Ironically, we could expect to see
Amnesty International denounce such a judicial process as a
violation of human rights standards.
I am not suggesting here that it is wrong to document and
publicize atrocities committed in wartime, or any other time.
Nor am I disputing that such a project would be both morally
and politically imperative. I am suggesting that it is important
to note that in the Nuremberg tribunal, this moral and politi-
cal imperative trumped, in an absolute fashion, the most fun-
damental mandates of law and judicial process. What
Nuremberg tells us is that, measured against the moral and
political imperative of denouncing atrocities, all competing
moral or legal imperatives are completely without weight. It is
not surprising that the Nuremberg trials have come to stand
for the just and proper denunciation of atrocities; the genocidal
project of the Nazis demanded denunciation. What is impor-
tant to note is how this project of denunciation trumped all
other moral issues and did so absolutely-not only the judicial
illegitimacy of the tribunals themselves, but also the Allied
war crimes, the use of atomic weapons and the callousness and
anti-Semitism of the many countries which denied refuge to
Jews fleeing the Holocaust.
We have inherited from Nuremberg not only the idea that
genocide, torture and slave labor violate principles of human
rights which transcend domestic positive law. We have equally
inherited the notion that the denunciation of human rights
violations is so compelling and consuming that, alongside of it,
all else-all acts of other parties which are less than atrocious,
which are merely brutal or shameful-not only pale in compar-
ison, but disappear altogether. We inherit from Nuremberg the
idea that when there are atrocities to denounce, we need not
look at the acts of the denouncers themselves. Indeed, we may
even be prohibited from doing so. It is as though the singular
monstrousness of human rights violations consumes or inhab-
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its the entirety of the moral space. When we are denouncing
atrocities, evil acts are not only absolutely evil, but exclusively
so; alongside them, acts that are merely wrong, or even awful,
are relatively righteous.
Thus, bringing an accusation of atrocities and consequent-
ly invoking the notion of human rights, means positing a'
"bright line" distinction between evil and righteousness-both
between evil persons and righteous persons and between evil
acts and righteous acts. We inherit from Nuremberg a notion
of human rights which posits a realm of evil acts and evil per-
sons-absolutely and exclusively evil. We inherit from
Nuremberg the notion that the moral denunciation of human
rights violations does not itself have rules or limits, or ambiva-
lence, or ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
In the introduction I suggested that I would explore the
concept of human rights in terms of its rhetorical uses and its
relation to political and economic agendas. Is it possible to
disentangle this very powerful moral concept from its political
uses? If not and if it is not universal or impartial but rather
deeply political and politicized, then is its validity irredeem-
ably compromised?
In a sense there is a relatively easy solution. If we take
the ordinary philosophical standards that are applicable to a
moral theory, such as consistency with our ethical intuitions
and logical coherence, then we can easily construct three mod-
els that each have some reasonable grounds for justification:
1. If by "human rights" we mean that we want to articulate
the most minimal and urgent conditions for human life,
then a concept of human rights would entail protection
from extreme physical violence. It would address "atroci-
ties" of the sort articulated in Just War doctrine-torture,
execution, genocide, enslavement.
2. If by "human rights" we mean that we want to articulate
everything immediately necessary for human beings to
live, then a concept of human rights would entail protec-
tion from extreme physical violence and economic security.
It would include the things described in model one, and it
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would also entail the provision of food, shelter, water,
clothing, employment and medical care.
3. If by "human rights" we mean that we want to articulate
everything necessary for a full and good life, or we are also
concerned with everything indirectly necessary to protect
essential economic and physical needs, then a concept of
human rights would include models one and two and
would also entail political and civil rights, including
speech, press, association, travel and political participa-
tion.
The one arrangement that cannot be justified is the cur-
rently dominant concept, which holds that protection from
atrocities are classed in the same category with political and
intellectual activities; and that political and intellectual activi-
ties are deemed to be more essential and immediate than eco-
nomic needs.
But I am not really interested in devising another model
to throw into the ring of contemporary philosophical debate.
My interest here lies more in exploring the relation between
the concept of human rights and the stakes. If there are atroci-
ties taking place and we do not intervene, then we are to some
degree complicit. Conversely, if we claim that an atrocity is
taking place and thereby justify, for example, military inter-
vention or an economic blockade, then we have the blood of
innocents on our hands if we are wrong, or if we are lying and
only invoking human rights as rhetoric. My view is that the
moral content of the conception of human rights is therefore
inseparable from the agenda which is set once claims of human
rights violations are invoked, because such claims both de-
mand action and also justify any action short of further human
rights violations.
My intention in writing this Article is not to propose and
justify my preferred model of human rights. Rather, I am in-
terested in making absolutely clear the relation between the
concept and the political interest; and that no purely abstract
choice is possible, only a fundamentally interested one. To the
extent that I am successful, we will adopt both our concepts
and our agendas with our eyes open. Neither states nor indi-
viduals will necessarily have more benevolent inclinations. If
there is an exhortation, it is not for humanity to become better
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or for states to show some sort of moral progress. Has anyone
since Comte really believed that this is a possibility? Rather,
my ambition is more modest: to make a certain kind of hypoc-
risy unavailable as a device that may be used by individuals
(or states) to delude themselves about their willingness to
participate in brutality and to hide their capacity to engage in
acts that are at the same time bloodthirsty and casual.
Because the concept of human rights is used to justify
military actions (it was one of the justifications for the Persian
Gulf War, in which an estimated 100,000 Iraqis were killed)
while excluding economic policies (although 37,000 children die
each day from "preventable causes" related to extreme poverty)
I am deeply concerned with its content and its uses. I am con-
cerned partly about the ways in which the concept of human
rights takes on the character of the sacred. The concept of
human rights purports to be an absolute and universal moral
principle, yet it eludes and in fact prevents moral discourse.
The moral position it asserts is seen as simply beyond ques-
tion, such that no moral and rational person could seriously
doubt its soundness. Furthermore, ideal and abstract entities
("rights") are deemed to have a reality and value wholly inde-
pendent of concrete life activities. In the dominant conception,
the danger of this ontological mistake, if you will, is that even
those political rights which are purely formal and never actual-
ized are treated as "things" of great substance and worth; and
for that reason are placed in the same category as protection
from torture, as though these two things have something in
common. In this context, I would be inclined to take a materi-
alist and utilitarian position, that one's profane life of eating,
sleeping, working and existing on this earth is more real and
valuable than one's abstract life, which includes the rights we
have that are never actualized and the entitlements which
have in fact given us nothing.
The dominant concept of human rights holds that political
rights by their very nature cannot be trivial, just as protection
from torture is never trivial. Yet we should hear how hollow
this rings. I do not think that one has to be a communist to see
how easily, for example, the right to vote, which is "sacred" in
a democracy, can slip easily into the trivial. As a citizen in a
democracy, my act of sovereignty truly lasts only a moment
and happens quite rarely--once every two or four years. I vote
for one of the candidates, neither of whom I have ever met,
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whose views and intentions I know only through carefully
staged campaign events and television commercials produced
by the same advertising agencies that market dishwashing
liquid.
Conversely, the dominant conception of human rights
holds that economic activity is less essential, less urgent-by
its nature, it is always profane and trumps nothing. But we
need to remember that economic activity includes not only
going shopping at the mall. It refers also to the life of the body
and all that entails-survival, pleasure, fear, struggle, respite,
exhaustion, abundance; the daily concrete acts that occupy so
very much of our lives-whether you get to work by car, or
stand in the rain waiting for a bus, whether you have a door-
man at the entrance of your apartment building or a cluster of
junkies eyeing your purse and your body as you come home
each night.
My concern about the dominant conception is also that, as
with any absolute moral claim, it is possible for righteousness
to justify acts that simple decency would not permit. Walzer
reminds us that holy wars are longer and bloodier than others,
because the righteousness of the cause demands nothing less
than total conquest or total sacrifice. In the end I wonder if we
aren't better off without any notion of absolute rights or moral
trumps. I wonder if we aren't better off with adopting some
garden-variety utilitarianism and reminding ourselves from
time to time of how much of the human condition is character-
ized by moral ambiguity. I am reminded of Max Weber's dis-
cussion in his essay Politics as a Vocation.67 Given that poli-
tics involves the legitimate use of violence, he suggests it is
incumbent upon someone who has a calling to political leader-
ship to understand that there are never clean decisions. The
ethic of responsibility is incompatible with the ethic of ultimate
ends, yet both are compelling. The political leader with a con-
science will be obliged constantly to navigate this ethical para-
dox. There is nothing impressive, Weber says, about those who
intoxicate themselves with the "sterile excitement" of pursuing
an absolute end. What is immensely moving, however, is when
an individual "is aware of a responsibility for the consequences
267. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER 127
(Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946).
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of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart
and soul... [But] somewhere he reaches the point where he
says: 'Here I stand; I can do no other."2 "s I wonder if, when
we embrace a certain conception of human rights, we don't
sometimes find ourselves intoxicated by the righteousness of
the cause, at the cost of moral discourse, rather than by the
service of it.
268. Id.
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